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INTRODUCTION

There have been four confirmation hearings in the United States Senate
for nominees to the Supreme Court since 2004—first, for John Roberts to be
the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2005, and then for Samuel Alito
in 2006, Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Elena Kagan in 2010 to be Associate
Justices. Each nominee faced hundreds of questions from a range of senators on
a range of different constitutional issues. Among the thousands of questions
asked in these four different Senate confirmation hearings, there were only a
few issues that were raised in each of the four. One such issue was the role of
comparative constitutional law in the American constitutional system.
Senators performing for the television cameras are not the only ones with
the feeling that something important and at least somewhat fresh and new is
developing in our constitutional system. Just over ten years ago, Mark Tushnet
wrote about the new possibilities of comparative constitutional law,1 and Bruce
Ackerman wrote about the rise of world constitutionalism.2 Comparative
constitutional law might offer different lessons to different scholars, but the
sense shared by all is that something new and original is transpiring—that the
Founding Moment for the domestic American Constitution might have
transpired in 1787, but the Founding Moment for comparative constitutional
law is right now.
However universal this sense is that comparative constitutional law is
new to the world of the American law school, it was actually universally
studied in American law schools in the first few decades after World War II.
Within a year of being appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1953,
Earl Warren traveled to Germany, Japan, and South Korea, speaking to
audiences about a “revival of comparative jurisprudence”3 in the United
States.4 Indeed, fifty years before the Senate Judiciary Committee asked Chief
Justice Roberts about comparative constitutional law, Fortune Magazine ran an
essay written by Chief Justice Warren about the importance of studying the
constitutions of other countries. In statements that today might have prompted
calls for his impeachment, Chief Justice Warren indicated that the principles in
the American Constitution were not “discovered by our Founding Fathers.
They had learned from the experience of people of all ages. But put together as
they were and adapted to our conditions and mores, they have served us well.”5
1.

Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225

(1999).
2.
Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997).
3.
Earl Warren, The Law and the Future, FORTUNE, Nov. 1955, at 106, 229.
4.
At a dinner to honor his visit to South Korea, Chief Justice Warren spoke of the “common
bond between men of law in all nations because . . . law . . . is not strictly our own.” Chief Justice Earl
Warren, Remarks at Dinner Honoring Chief Justice Warren hosted by Korean Chief Justice Co ChinMan (Sept. 12, 1967) (transcript available at Library of Congress, Register of Earl Warren papers).
There are certainly Justices who travel around the world now, but it is hard to imagine them making
such bold claims about the role of comparative law in the United States as Chief Justice Warren did in
his lecture.
5.
Thomas Ginsburg, The Warren Court in East Asia: An Essay in Comparative Law, in
EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 265, 266 n.4
(Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007).
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Justice William O. Douglas gave a series of lectures and published a book
about the constitutional law of India.6 Justice Robert Jackson, after working on
the Nuremberg Trials, traveled the country and the world discussing recent
comparative constitutional changes.7
The actions of these three Justices were not anomalous, but were instead a
reflection of the burgeoning interest in comparative constitutional law in
American law schools during that time period. Many law schools created
comparative constitutional law classes during the first few decades after World
War II, and a substantial percentage of the articles in the two leading law
reviews (the Harvard Law Review and The Yale Law Journal) touched in some
way on comparative constitutional law—almost as many articles as touched on
American Supreme Court cases resolving issues of American constitutional
law. Erwin Griswold—Dean of the Harvard Law School for twenty-one years,
Solicitor General of the United States under President Nixon, and the lawyer
who argued more cases before the United States Supreme Court than any other
during the twentieth century—wrote several law review articles about the
constitutional experiences of foreign countries.8
But just as quickly as comparative constitutional law came to prominence
in American law schools, starting in the early 1970s it began to disappear. Law
schools that had earlier created comparative constitutional law classes scrapped
those classes in the next few decades. The same two leading law reviews that
had earlier published many articles on comparative constitutional law issues
then went several decades before publishing another article touching on the
topic. Just as soon as comparative constitutional law rose to prominence, it
disappeared into thin air.
The reasons for the rise—and later the fall—of comparative constitutional
law are complicated, but many of these reasons revolve around the changing
focus of the elite members of the legal profession. This dynamic explains why
comparative constitutional law first rose to prominence in the decades after
World War II, when American lawyers returned from their service overseas and
the attention of the profession and the country was focused overseas; it also
explains why when the attention of the profession turned inward during the
years of the Warren Court, comparative constitutional law largely disappeared.
This dynamic of a profession engaged in comparative developments was also
cultivated by scholars of comparative constitutional law themselves. The

6.
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA (1956).
7.
Helen J. Knowles, “Judgment of the Law”: Justice Robert H. Jackson and the Foundations
of the London Charter (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340627.
8.
See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The “Coloured Vote Case” in South Africa, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1361 (1952) [hereinafter Griswold, Coloured Vote]; Erwin N. Griswold, The Demise of the High
Court of Parliament in South Africa, 66 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1953); Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees: A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1951);
Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools and the Legal Profession, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305 (1955); Erwin N.
Griswold, Legal Education: Extent To Which Know-How in Practice Should Be Taught in Law Schools,
6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 324 (1954); Erwin N. Griswold, Observations on Legal Education in Australia, 5 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 139 (1952).
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profession started to focus more on public law litigation in American federal
courts during later years, and this activity occupied many of the resources and
energy that had earlier gone to comparative constitutional examination.
Examining this world of American law schools after the fall of comparative
constitutional law can also point to some of the deficiencies in American
constitutional scholarship and some of the reasons why an infrastructure and
related social movements have organized and supported Warren Court-style
domestic litigation—to the detriment of comparative constitutional law, and
therefore to the detriment of American judicial review. A similar story and
division of time periods could be told for comparative law more generally, but
this Article begins this story by focusing in particular on comparative
constitutional law, which I define as the study of the domestic constitutional
law of other countries.
Part II examines the rise and fall of comparative constitutional law by
examining the scholarship produced and classes taught by faculty at several
dozen law schools. The Article then turns in Part III to offer some initial
explanations for this dramatic turn of events. After Part III explains why
comparative constitutional law succeeded and then disappeared, Part IV turns
to discuss the significant costs of the disappearance of comparative
constitutional law in particular. For constitutional scholarship, the “birth of an
academic obsession”9 focused almost exclusively on domestic constitutional
litigation was disastrous. It is certainly true that this helped “constitutional law
[become] the most prestigious field in the legal academy.”10 The most notable
scholars that the legal academy has ever produced wrote about how the
American Constitution should be interpreted and how judicial review should
operate. But, by ignoring comparative constitutional law, these and other
scholars neglected to consider that other countries had been experimenting with
some of the very ideas they advocated in their academic writings. Deprived of
the insights to be gained from these comparative experiences, our domestic
constitutional scholarship simply ignored significant insights that could have
been gained from devoting attention to comparative constitutional law.
The damage that the fall of comparative constitutional law did to the
vocation of constitutional scholarship is also matched by the damage that this
disappearance did to comparative constitutional law and to judicial review. As
Part IV also discusses, the focus of the legal profession on domestic
constitutional litigation related to domestic constitutional arguments
encouraged the creation of an institutional infrastructure and social movements
related to this litigation, which in turn created the personnel, the resources, and
the intellectual support for scholarship about these developments. From the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on the jurisprudential left to the
Institute for Justice on the jurisprudential right, an entire “support structure”11
9.
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
10. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 87 (1995).
11. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
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was created to develop arguments about domestic constitutional law. This came
at a cost, one that scholars have yet to consider: because there was an
infrastructure related to traditional domestic constitutional litigation but no
similar infrastructure for comparative constitutional law, comparative
constitutional law had no chance for success in the long term.12 The result was
bad for constitutional law and for judicial review, because the resources and
intellectual support for judicial review were based solely on arguments that
could be derived from the American constitutional experience, rather than
including the many successful constitutional experiences of countries around
the world.
After discussing the origins of this lack of interest in comparative
constitutional law and the problems caused by this disinterest, Part V turns to
some proposed solutions. Comparative constitutional law has enjoyed
something of a revival in the past ten years, but it has been a fragile one. For
the field to continue to reemerge, it must do what it did during the years when
law schools were full of constitutional ideas from around the world: it must
continue to solicit the interest of the legal profession, and of a wide range of
legal scholars, in all of the many things that comparative constitutional law has
to offer. Part V considers some strategies to ensure that the legal profession and
law schools return to their interest in comparative constitutional law, but in a
more durable and permanent manner.
II.

THE POSTWAR RISE AND FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The creation moment for American law schools was surely during the
nineteenth century, either during the earlier portion of the century with the
creation of Litchfield Law School in Connecticut or during the latter part of the
century with the tenure of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of Harvard
Law School and the creation of the case method of teaching.13 If the creation
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21 (1998).
12. Very few of the discussions about the social movements related to the emergence of the
Warren Court focus on how these movements spurned comparative and international law and thereby
precluded the creation of comparative and international legal movements. There is much scholarship
about the relationship between social movements and the creation of constitutional law, but it is almost
entirely focused on the domestic angle. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women’s Movement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1421 (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323
(2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture]; Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
13. The law school at Litchfield was really “[t]he first American school of law, organized
strictly to prepare students to be lawyers, and distinct from a general bachelor’s degree course.” Steve
Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture
Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 564 (1997); see also id. at 565 (“The Litchfield [program] established the
framework for instruction in the professional law school.”). Langdell’s most significant contribution was
to create a system of legal education based on the idea that “knowledge of the law is best derived from
its sources, the cases.” Id. at 597. This system of legal education quickly became the most popular
system in the country. See id. at 608.
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moment was during the nineteenth century, though, the consolidation moment
for American law schools was during the twentieth century, especially the years
after World War II. It was during this period that the number of law schools
skyrocketed, in part due first to the GI Bill and then to the Baby Boom during
that time. It was also during this period that the modern system of legal
scholarship was created.
Yet our knowledge of American legal education in the years after World
War II is thin. The leading studies of American legal education focus on the
Litchfield and Langdell creation moments of the nineteenth century, or the
movement from the Harvard-inspired legal formalism of earlier generations to
the Yale-inspired legal realism of the years before World War II.14 There are
several articles that have referenced, in passing, some changes in the classes
being offered in American law schools over the years, in part by examining
what classes were being offered by law schools during these decades after
World War II or what articles were published by their law reviews.15 But these
articles have always examined a very small number of (not so randomly
generated) course listings or law reviews from very few years from the very
elite law schools.16 That gives us only a partial picture of life in the legal
academy during only a few years at a few elite law schools. Part of what this
Article contributes, then, is to begin a discussion based on a more complete set
of information about the teaching and scholarship of American law schools
since World War II. This Article still contains more discussion about the elite
law schools, for reasons that Laura Kalman has highlighted: there is simply

14. Robert Stevens, author of the most comprehensive account of the history of American
legal education, spends a small fraction of his book on more recent developments. ROBERT STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL AND LEGAL EDUCATION FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 206-17 (1987).
15. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60
VAND. L. REV. 339, 339-66 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Geologic Strata] (examining changes in classes
offered by law schools); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the “Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2075, 2099-2100 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Lawyers] (examining changes in articles published in
law reviews); Michael J. Saks, Howard Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law,
Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship? A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One
Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1163 (1996).
16. For instance, Robert Gordon’s study of changing courses being offered examined just a
few years at six of the most highly ranked law schools. See Gordon, Geologic Strata, supra note 15, at
349 n.18 (“The following generalizations about changes in course offerings are based on sampling of
law school catalogues in four private (Harvard, Stanford, Vanderbilt, Yale) and two public (Michigan,
Texas) university law schools at ten year intervals from 1890 to 1990. We . . . went through the samples
looking for first appearances of new courses and for the appearance and disappearance of required
courses. Had we had more time, we would have liked to sample a much wider range of schools,
including more non-elite schools . . . .”). Gordon’s examination of changing publication trends also
focused on a small set of data about the most elite law reviews. See Gordon, Lawyers, supra note 15, at
2099 (“Ariela Gross searched at my request the contents of three major law reviews in 1910 and every
tenth year thereafter, to sense historical trends; and of five major law reviews in the last five years, to
sense current trends.”). John Langbein’s study of comparative law scholarship also focused on just a few
elite law schools. See John Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 546 (1995) (“Of the twenty-five schools that were top-ranked in the 1993 national
ranking of university law schools, I have obtained catalog listings for the curriculum at all but one.”).
The closest to a comprehensive study of changes in legal education we have is one study about changes
in the content of law review articles published. See Saks et al., supra note 15. But the authors of that
study, even though they examine ten law reviews, have other limitations in their data. For instance, in
ensuring that they cover a range of schools, they rank schools “according to the size of their library
holdings.” Id. at 1171. They also examined only two years, 1960 and 1985. Id. at 1171-72.
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more available information about these schools, and these schools tended to
have an outsized influence on legal education.17
There are many trends to be gleaned from this information, but this Part
focuses on one of them in greater detail: from 1945 until roughly 1972,
comparative constitutional law became an accepted part of legal education in a
much greater way than in the years before 1945. After 1972, as Part III will
discuss in greater detail, the rise of the Warren Court (the political and legal
prominence of that Court, the law clerks who clerked for that Court and then
became professors, and a legal academy writing for and about that Court) led to
the disappearance of comparative constitutional law. During earlier periods, the
increasing interest in constitutional developments around the rest of the world
took some time to become fully realized. As law professors returned from
service in World War II and as constitutions were drafted overseas in greater
numbers, gradually that interest affected law schools.
The same thing happened with the gradual disappearance of comparative
constitutional law. It took time for the Warren Court to have this effect on the
pedagogy and scholarship of law schools. The former Warren Court clerks had
to finish their clerkships and begin their teaching and writing careers. The legal
profession needed time to realize the importance of the Warren Court and
arrange funding for activities related to the Court. The “second Warren
Court”18 presided from 1962 until 1969, and even before that, there were other
major developments in constitutional law scholarship (many in response to
Brown v. Board of Education19), like Herbert Wechsler’s article on neutral
principles,20 Learned Hand’s Holmes Lectures,21 and Alexander Bickel’s The
Least Dangerous Branch.22 These types of scholarly developments were
important on their own, but during the Rise Era (the period from 1945 until
1972) they were more exceptional than during the Fall Era (the period from
1972 until 1999). The elite law professors at the elite law schools in the elite
law reviews sometimes wrote on issues related to the Warren Court during the
Rise Era—even if not as much as during later periods—but an examination of
other law reviews suggests that the attention paid to these issues was
widespread only later. It was not until roughly 1972 that the Fall Era began, and
domestic constitutional law supplanted—and almost entirely eliminated—
comparative constitutional law. The global dimension of legal education that

17. See Laura Kalman, Professing Law: Elite Law School Professors in the Twentieth Century,
in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 337, 340 (Austin Sarat, Bryant G. Garth & Robert A. Kagan
eds., 2002). Note also that Barry Friedman’s article about postwar constitutional scholarship, the only
other significant discussion of law schools and constitutional scholarship after World War II, is
essentially exclusively about debates at the elite law schools by elite law professors. See Friedman,
supra note 9.
18. Many have called the period from the appointment of Arthur Goldberg to the Court in
1962 until the retirement of Earl Warren in 1969 the “second Warren Court.” See, e.g., Friedman, supra
note 9, at 201.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1959).
21. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
22. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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had an almost natural and assumed part in American legal education in the
years after World War II quickly dissolved in favor of new areas of particular
constitutional interest.
A. The Postwar Rise of Comparative Constitutional Law
In the years after 1945, American law schools started to expand their
focus on comparative constitutional law. Legal scholarship featured discussions
of comparative constitutional issues in its most prominent publication locations
(including the emerging series of Harvard Law Review Forewords published
every year) and in articles by the most prominent figures in American
constitutional scholarship at the time. Moreover, consistent with a field both
new and becoming increasingly accepted, the nation’s leading law reviews
contained methodological debates about what this new field should look like.
This period of time—from 1945 until 1972—will be called the “Rise Era” in
comparative constitutional law.
In the first issue it ran after the end of World War II, The Yale Law
Journal decided to focus on a topic that was in the news at the time: what the
end of World War II meant for constitutional democracies in the new
international legal system. Justice William O. Douglas, himself a scholar of
some stature,23 wrote the lead article for the symposium about the potential
domestic constitutional structures of countries in the new international
community.24 Yale Law Professor Grant Gilmore, known as perhaps the most
influential contracts scholar of his generation,25 wrote an article for the
symposium about the International Court of Justice and comparative
constitutional law.26 Gilmore later wrote several other articles about
comparative constitutional law.27
In the years to come The Yale Law Journal would publish many more
articles with comparative constitutional law dimensions.28 The Harvard Law

23. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and
Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2000) (labeling Douglas a
“prominent scholar”).
24. William O. Douglas, Foreword, 55 YALE L.J. 865, 868-69 (1946).
25. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, What Grant Gilmore Taught Us, 92 YALE L.J. 6, 6 (1982)
(“Grant’s reputation was enormous . . . .”); Nathan Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98
GEO. L.J. 77, 82 (2009) (discussing the “influential” scholarship of Gilmore).
26. Grant Gilmore, The International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J. 1049 (1946).
27. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Circular Priority Systems: South African Apartheid Legislation,
71 YALE L.J. 53 (1961).
28. Of the 517 articles published between 1945 and 1972 in The Yale Law Journal, fifty
touched upon comparative constitutional issues. For some notable examples, see Charles E. Clark &
William D. Rogers, The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization, 61 YALE
L.J. 1147 (1952); Jan Deutsch, Some Problems of Church and State in the Weimar Constitution, 72
YALE L.J. 457 (1963); Walter Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1 (1965); John
N. Hazard, Mali’s Socialism and the Soviet Legal Model, 77 YALE L.J. 28 (1967); Hans Kelsen, Law,
State and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, 57 YALE L.J. 377 (1948); Karl Loewenstein, The Bonn
Constitution and the European Defense Community Treaties, 64 YALE L.J. 805 (1955); Karl
Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative Process in Occupied Germany: I, 57 YALE L.J. 724 (1948); Karl
Loewenstein, Law and the Legislative Process in Occupied Germany: II, 57 YALE L.J. 994 (1948); Inga
S. Markovits, Civil Law in East Germany—Its Development and Relation to Soviet Legal History and
Ideology, 78 YALE L.J. 1 (1968); and Pradyumna K. Tripathi, Free Speech in the Indian Constitution:
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Review, the other leading law review at the time and since, published a similar
number of articles raising comparative constitutional topics.29 When it was time
to run a series of tributes to Justice Felix Frankfurter, The Yale Law Journal
invited a noted judge from another country to write one of the tribute essays,30
and the Harvard Law Review did the same in their tribute to Justice
Frankfurter.31 When major constitutional developments arose overseas, such as
the creation of the innovative French Constitution of the Fifth Republic in
1958, law reviews usually ran an article discussing them.32 Other law reviews
of similar stature had a similar percentage and prominence of comparative
constitutional law articles.33 Even outside of the elite law reviews, there were
many articles discussing comparative constitutional themes—albeit slightly
fewer articles than in the top law reviews—and certainly more than during the
Fall Era of comparative constitutional law.34
These articles discussing comparative constitutional themes were featured

Background and Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 384 (1958).
29. Of the 694 articles published in the Harvard Law Review between 1945 and 1972, sixtyseven touched upon issues of comparative constitutional law. In addition to the Erwin Griswold articles
cited in note 8, supra, for other notable examples see John Clarke Adams & Mauro Cappelleti,
Comment, Judicial Review of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1207 (1966); Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication Without a Constitution: The Case of Israel,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1245 (1969); Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and Judicial
Independence: 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1969); Morris R. Cohen, Italian Contributions to the
Philosophy of Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 577 (1946); Carl J. Friedrich, The New French Constitution in
Political and Historical Perspective, 72 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1959); Walter Gellhorn, Settling
Disagreements with Officials in Japan, 79 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1966); W. Barton Leach, Comment,
Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797
(1967); Karl Loewenstein, Reconstruction of the Administration of Justice in American-Occupied
Germany, 61 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1948); Edward McWhinney, Judicial Restraint and the West German
Constitutional Court, 75 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1961); and Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law and History As
Bases for Chinese Law, 61 HARV. L. REV. 749 (1948).
30. Owen Dixon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: A Tribute from Australia, 67 YALE L.J. 179 (1957).
31. Lord Evershed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 76 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Friedrich, supra note 29.
33. For some prominent examples, see, for example, José A. Cabranes, Human Rights and
Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147 (1967); Mauro Cappelletti,
Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1017 (1970); Cornelius P. Cotter,
Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers: The British Experience, 5 STAN. L. REV. 382 (1953); Cornelius
P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Experience 6 STAN. L. REV. 238 (1954);
Kenneth Culp Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of Practical
Jurisprudence, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 201 (1961); Herman Finer, The British System, 18 U. CHI. L. REV.
521 (1951); Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal
Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949); John N. Hazard, The Soviet Union and a World Bill of Rights,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 1095 (1947); Paul G. Kauper, The Constitutions of West Germany and the United
States: A Comparative Study, 58 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1960); Hans Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47 CAL.
L. REV. 107 (1959); Viscount Kilmuir, Justice Jackson and Nuremberg—A British Tribute, 8 STAN. L.
REV. 54 (1955); Karl Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe: Illusion and Reality—An Appraisal
of the Methods: Part I, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1952); Karl Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe:
Illusion and Reality—An Appraisal of the Methods: Part II, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (1952);
Symposium, Man’s Right to Knowledge, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 710 (1954); M. Ramaswamy,
Constitutional Developments in India 1600-1955, 8 STAN. L. REV. 326 (1955); and Pradyumna K.
Tripathi, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (1947).
34. For some prominent examples in these journals, see Bernard Green, Federalism and the
Administration of Criminal Justice: The Treatment of Obscenity in the United States, Canada and
Australia, 51 KY. L.J. 667 (1963); Frank R. Lacy, Yugoslavia: Practice and Procedure in a Communist
Country, 43 OR. L. REV. 1 (1963); and Yasuo Tokikuni, Obscenity and the Japanese Constitution, 51
KY. L.J. 703 (1963).
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in some of the most prominent locations for academic debate in American legal
scholarship. Consider, first of all, the content of the annual Forewords to the
Harvard Law Review, first published during the Rise Era.35 These Forewords
“are widely taken to be good indications of the state of the field [of
constitutional law],”36 and have “a considerable prestige and influence.”37
During this period, many of these Forewords touched on comparative
constitutional themes.38
In another sign of the role of comparative constitutional law during the
Rise Era—a topic that will be discussed in greater detail in Part III—major
scholars of constitutional law of all sorts were writing articles discussing
comparative constitutional law. Lectures and essays by Chief Justice Warren
were published for a general audience in places like Fortune Magazine, and
Chief Justice Warren also spoke about comparative constitutional law in a
speech reproduced in the Kentucky Law Journal.39 Noted Senator William
Fulbright wrote in the same journal about the importance of promoting
constitutionalism around the world for American foreign policy.40 As
mentioned earlier, Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School wrote several
articles with comparative constitutional themes.41 Kenneth Karst, who wrote
one of the leading articles justifying many of the Warren Court’s privacy
decisions,42 wrote about Latin American constitutional law.43 Moreover, when
a field of scholarship begins to increase in size and prominence, it goes through
moments of significant self-definition. This type of methodological debate and
angst about comparative constitutional law appeared even in the mainstream,
general interest law reviews of the day, like the Columbia Law Review44 and
the Harvard Law Review.45
35. Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and
Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 463 (1994) (“Since 1951 the editors of the Harvard
Law Review have selected a prominent scholar of constitutional law to write a ‘Foreword’ to the
Review’s annual survey of the work of the Supreme Court.”).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 464.
38. See, e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term—Foreword: Of Time and
Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1960) (discussing the social
situation of British judges); Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term—Foreword:
Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1953) (discussing a British House
of Lords decision); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Foreword: “Equal in Origin
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV.
143, 163 (1964) (discussing British federalism); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1956
Term—Foreword: The Citizen’s Immunities and Public Opinion, 71 HARV. L. REV. 85, 86 (1957)
(discussing British rules about Communist sympathizers).
39. Earl Warren, Address at the World Conference on World Peace Through the Rule of Law,
Athens, Greece (July 1, 1965), 53 KY. L.J. 5 (1965).
40. William J. Fulbright, Foreign Policy—Old Myths and New Realities, 53 KY. L.J. 13
(1965).
41. See supra note 8.
42. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
43. Kenneth L. Karst, Teaching Latin American Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 685, 685 (1971).
Karst was a member of the Board of Editors for The American Journal of Comparative Law.
44. Kenneth S. Carlston, The Teaching of International Law in Law Schools, 48 COLUM. L.
REV. 516 (1948); Ernst Rabel, On Institutes for Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 227 (1947); John
R. Stevenson, Comparative and Foreign Law in American Law Schools, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 613 (1950).
45. Angelo Piero Sereni, On Teaching Comparative Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 770 (1951).
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Given the interest in comparative constitutional themes by American law
professors in their writing, it should come as no surprise that many law schools
featured new classes touching on these themes. In the early part of the 1950s, a
series of new teaching materials related to comparative law more generally and
comparative constitutional law in particular appeared for the first time.46 The
first law school to offer a comparative constitutional law class was the
University of Alabama Law School, which offered a course billed as “a
comparison of the American constitutional system with those of other nations,
including a review of the political institutions on the background of the
constitutional practice of various countries.”47 Other schools created similar
classes with a range of titles, from “Comparative Jurisprudence” at the
University of California to “Comparative-Historical Method” at Harvard Law
School.48 But the content of the classes was substantially similar: an
examination of the constitutional structures of the rest of the world.
In accord with this increased interest in infusing course offerings with
classes on comparative law in general and comparative constitutional law in
particular, American law schools also started to invite students and faculty from
overseas to teach and collaborate with their American colleagues. At Yale Law
School, for instance, several of the leading figures of the Israeli legal system
enrolled as graduate law students around this time.49 The law school also
invited foreign faculty to become a part of the life of the law school: Otto
Kahn-Freund of the London School of Economics became a regular visitor.50
Notable foreign faculty also visited other American law schools for the first
time: Julius Stone from Australia visited at Colorado, as did René David from
France,51 and Konrad Zweigert from Germany visited at Michigan.52 Harvard
Law School created a “Joseph Story Fellows” program to recruit young foreign
academics to teach and write at the law school,53 and also regularly invited
Japanese law faculty to teach and visit.54 The same was true of other law
schools of all kinds, from Indiana to Tulane to Berkeley to Idaho.55
These new foreign visitors to law schools may have been mere visitors,
but this was also the period when a substantial number of academic refugees
from foreign countries played a substantial role in a number of American law

46. See Max Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law: A Book Survey, 1 AM. J. COMP.
L. 95, 95 (1952) (“Several books entitled comparative law or the like have appeared on the scene in
recent years.”).
47. Stevenson, supra note 44, at 623.
48. Id. at 618.
49. Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How, and Why Did Israeli Law Faculties
Come To Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 653, 660 (2009).
50. Joseph Dainow, Exchange Opportunities for American and Foreign Law Teachers, 9 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 57, 57 (1956).
51. Id. at 60.
52. Alfred F. Conard & Eric Stein, Foreign Law in Foreign Language, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC.
232, 232 (1957).
53. Daniel R. Coquilette, In Memoriam: Arthur T. von Mehren, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1950
(2006).
54. Dainow, supra note 50, at 62.
55. See, e.g., id. at 62-63.
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schools. Scholars like Max Rheinstein at the University of Chicago Law School
and Rudolf Schlesinger enjoyed considerable success writing about
comparative law, including sometimes about comparative constitutional law.56
One refugee, Felix Frankfurter, held a position on the Supreme Court, and
sometimes cited comparative constitutional law.57 Indeed, in many ways it was
the success of these refugees—and their failure to designate (domestic)
successors, as John Langbein has noted58—that was part of the reason that
comparative law in general (perhaps including comparative constitutional law)
came to be seen as a “refugee field.”59
American law professors were also involved in advising other countries
on the creation of their constitutional systems. Stanford Law School hosted a
major conference related to the creation of the Indian Constitution and the
Indian legal system.60 Former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound
advised pre-Communist China.61 Arthur Von Mehren served as a visiting
professor at the Indian Law Institute.62 Stanford Law School Dean Carl B.
Spaeth worked with leaders of the Indian bar on a range of public law issues in
India.63 And as a sign of how accepted comparative constitutional scholarship
and pedagogy was, consider how uncontroversial all of these activities were,
despite the fact that they took place during the McCarthy Era, when other
American academics were fired for their writings about and interest in other
countries.64
Of course, the prominence of comparative constitutional law in
scholarship and pedagogy should not be overstated. Comparative constitutional
law was far from the most substantial topic of discussion in American
constitutional scholarship during the Rise Era. Most of the major pieces of
constitutional law scholarship at the time were focused entirely on domestic
constitutional law issues.65 The most notable feature of the Rise Era was the
56. Langbein, supra note 16, at 547.
57. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 743, 840-45 (2005) (discussing all of the opinions written by Justice Frankfurter that
reference comparative constitutional law).
58. Langbein, supra note 16, at 547-48.
59. Id. at 547.
60. Lawrence R. Ebb, Preface to PUBLIC LAW PROBLEMS IN INDIA: A SURVEY REPORT, at v, v
(Lawrence R. Ebb ed., 1957).
61. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 507,
515-16 (1964). Pound later wrote an article about his experiences. Pound, supra note 29; see also
Mitchel Lasser, Comparative Readings of Roscoe Pound’s Jurisprudence, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 719, 728
(2002) (“The depth and breadth of Pound’s multinational and trans-historical field of substantive and
theoretical references suggest that Pound might possess a remarkably panoramic vista for large-scale
comparative analysis.”).
62. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Law and Legal Education in India: Some Observations, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1180 (1965).
63. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 454 n.43
(2004).
64. See PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THIELENS, JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND 70 (1958).
65. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1952); Arthur E. Sutherland, The Supreme Court and the General Will, 82 PROC. AM. ACAD.
ARTS & SCI. 169 (1953).
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high level of interest in comparative constitutional law scholarship and teaching
during this period—and how much that contrasted with what was to follow.
B. The Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law
As rapidly as comparative constitutional law ascended in American law
schools, it disappeared just as quickly from 1972 until 1999—what this Article
calls the “Fall Era,” a twenty-seven year period similar in length but radically
different in focus from the Rise Era. As Part III discusses in greater detail, in
place of comparative constitutional law came attention to the Supreme Court
and the changes in domestic constitutional law resulting from the Court’s
decisions. Consider, for instance, the pages of the nation’s law reviews. The
Harvard Law Review went a few decades after 1972 before publishing another
article on comparative constitutional issues. Only two Harvard Law Review
Forewords during the Fall Era discuss comparative constitutional law.66
Outside of the highest ranked law reviews, the change was similar and even
more dramatic.
While during the Rise Era comparative constitutional law was a topic of
scholarly interest to all sorts of scholars, during the Fall Era hardly any major,
notable legal scholar outside of the specialized field of comparative
constitutional law took any interest in the subject.67 The attention of American
legal scholars turned instead to the Warren Court and the developments in
constitutional law generated by Warren Court decisions. Every single year
during the Fall Era, the Harvard Law Review and The Yale Law Journal
published at least one article about a Supreme Court case and one article about
the career or recent death of a scholar who wrote about the Supreme Court.
This scholarship about the Warren Court was so substantial that there began to
be substantial scholarship about Warren Court scholarship. D.C. Circuit Judge
J. Skelly Wright took to the pages of the Harvard Law Review to write about
“Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court.”68 Anthony
Lewis, the Supreme Court reporter for The New York Times, covered Bickel’s
Holmes Lectures.69
Just as it was earlier important to qualify the limitations of the increase in
attention to comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era, so too it is

66. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1980) (discussing free speech in Britain); Paul A. Freund, The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term—Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34 (1974)
(discussing a British case related to executive privilege).
67. David Currie is an exception. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986). Currie’s contribution to our understanding of the German Basic Law was
memorialized in a symposium issue dedicated to his work. See, e.g., Peter E. Quint, David Currie and
German Constitutional Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 2081 (2008). Gerhard Casper, later Dean of the University
of Chicago School of Law and President of Stanford University, was another comparative constitutional
law scholar writing at the time who was integrated into other constitutional and legal debates. See, e.g.,
Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177 (1985).
68. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971).
69. Anthony Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REV. 305 (1961).
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important to note that even during the Fall Era there was still some lingering
interest in comparative constitutional law—just not much. The Fall Era was the
period when interest in international law grew substantially, as Part III
discusses in greater detail, and part of that discussion inevitably involved some
discussion of comparative constitutional law. More importantly and more
directly related, this was roughly the same period as the creation of the law and
development movement,70 which represented essentially the exclusive source
of interest in comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era.
But, for several reasons, the rise of the law and development movement
was not enough to stem the disappearance of comparative constitutional law
scholarship during the Fall Era. The law and development movement was a
much more isolated and much less popular movement than, among other
movements, the comparative constitutional law movement during the Rise Era.
A few law schools—primarily Yale and Wisconsin—focused their energies on
law and development, but most law schools had neither a single scholar nor a
single class focused on the topic. Perhaps a decade or less after its creation,
whatever there was of the law and development movement faded and almost
disappeared, although there are some signs of a small recent revival.71
At the same time that comparative constitutional law was disappearing
from the scholarship of law professors, it was also disappearing from the
classes being offered by these professors. Law schools instead began to offer
classes in fields related to the decisions of the Warren Court.72 Searching
through the course offering directories shows almost no listings of comparative
constitutional classes, but lots of listings of new constitutional law classes.
In terms of the role of comparative constitutional law during the years
after World War II, then, there were two clear periods. The first period featured
broad and robust interest in comparative constitutional law. Journals of all sorts
published articles on the topic. Faculty of all kinds wrote on the topic. Students
of all backgrounds enrolled in classes on the topic. During the second period,
almost the complete opposite was true. Very few articles were published. Very
few faculty wrote about the topic. Classes on the topic were scaled back and in
some places eliminated. Such a dramatic change in such a relatively short
period of time leads to the obvious question: what happened?
III. EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
The rise and fall of comparative constitutional law took all of a

70. See Brian Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
470, 470 (1995) (book review) (“Law and development has been a field of academic study for about
thirty years.”).
71. See, e.g., DAVID M. TRUBEK, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past,
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74, 81
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
72. See Gordon, Geologic Strata, supra note 15, at 361 (“The constitutional law of free speech
and religion, of criminal procedure, and of federal jurisdiction have become topics so large as to have
been broken off and made into separate courses.”).
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generation. Such a dramatic story is more than mere accident. This Part
explores this narrative of comparative constitutional law and the reasons for its
initial success and eventual disappearance. In doing so, it highlights some of
the dynamics that lead to the rise and fall of jurisprudential movements more
generally, dynamics that I will discuss in greater detail in future writings. As
this Part discusses, a crucial variable—perhaps not the only variable, but an
indispensible one—in explaining the rise and fall of comparative constitutional
law was its relationship with elite sectors of the legal profession. A strong
relationship with the profession might not be a sufficient basis for a
movement’s success, but it is a helpful one. This relationship between the legal
profession and a scholarly movement has been noted in passing before,73 but
this Part will explain this strong relationship in the context of comparative
constitutional law in greater detail.
This relationship in the context of comparative constitutional law was
created because of the structure of the production of legal scholarship, on both
the “supply side” and the “demand side.” By the “supply side,” I refer to those
who actually produce the classes and scholarship—law professors. By the
“demand side,” I mean those who consume the classes and scholarship of law
professors—law students and lawyers.
On the “supply side,” during the Rise Era, the most accomplished
personnel of the legal academy were coming from a legal profession that was
itself more interested in the rest of the world, and thus had practiced in areas
more tied to the rest of the world. The profession affects the pedagogical and
scholarly agenda of the law professor because it provides the developments
(and in the case of the elite profession, the most important developments) that
serve as the potential topics about which law professors write and teach. During
the Rise Era many of the more interesting developments were transpiring
outside of the United States. The comparative orientation of the profession,
then, was “jurisgenerative”74 in the sense of generating law and debates about
law.
On the “demand side,” too, the profession mattered enormously in
creating interest in comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era and
discouraging interest during the Fall Era. Part of the reason for the decline of
classes about comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era, for instance,
was because of the decline in student interest in comparative constitutional
topics; similarly, part of the increase in classes during the Rise Era was due to
student interest in comparative constitutional law. Law students are the
consumers of the pedagogy of law schools. These changes in student
preferences also affected the production of scholarship. Law students, after all,
are the ones who decide which articles to publish, and changes in their interests
73. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515,
1539 (1991) (“[T]he academy has had difficulty understanding how people could be interested in the
law without being interested in influencing policymakers . . . . The concern of law schools with those
presently holding power, or likely to do so in the near future, makes the more radical program associated
with critical legal studies seem disconnected from the mission of the law school.”).
74. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 33 (1983).
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and priorities affected which articles were accepted (at all and by the most
prestigious journals) during the Rise and Fall Eras.
The elite parts of the legal profession were also partly responsible for the
change in interest in comparative constitutional law because of a shift in the
allocation of resources. Resources from elite parts of the profession shifted
from legal issues outside of the United States to domestic federal public law
litigation. The legal arms of groups like the Ford Foundation shifted their focus
from creating or recreating domestic legal systems in the rest of the world to
funding federal litigation and law school clinics in the United States.
This shift in focus in law schools was also affected by the behavior of law
professors. During the Rise Era, professors writing about comparative
constitutional law were producing “integrated” scholarship—scholarship that
speaks to what a broader community of scholars and American legal
professionals might find interesting.75 Scholarship will speak more to the
profession if it is normative rather than descriptive—telling lawyers and judges
what they can and should do—which is why so much of legal scholarship is in
fact normative. The revival of constitutional history, for instance, was assisted
by the ability of constitutional historians to speak about what courts should
decide in actual cases in American courts.76 For comparative constitutional law
today, integrated scholarship may be biased in favor of discussing what
comparative constitutional law means for American institutions.
The production of integrated scholarship during the Rise Era also led to a
wider range of law schools and law professors finding comparative
constitutional law scholarship useful. The elite and wealthy law schools tend to
have faculty who are more interested in intellectual luxury goods—scholarship
with a less obvious relationship to the profession.77 But if this elite, luxury
scholarship is integrated into other fields of scholarship and made of interest to
the profession, then students and faculty at other schools will find it of interest.
It will thus attract the interest of a broader range of law professors, increasing
the status of the field in law schools, exposing more students to the field, and

75. I used this concept in an earlier article where I was asked to respond to an article by Mark
Tushnet about comparative constitutional law. See David Fontana, The Next Generation of
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 445, 448 (2004) (“We need to move beyond ‘all or nothing’ scholarship on this topic and find a
way to create a principled system of integrative activities. Consequently, the best way forward is to
begin considering how to create a world where the domestic and foreign are integrated, but integrated in
the optimal manner.”). Imperialism might be good for the power of all intellectual fields. See Jack
Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 53 (1985) (discussing how the
imperialism of economics has helped that field). But what is different about legal scholarship is that its
imperialism must extend not just to other fields of scholarship, but to the practice of law itself.
76. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545 (2006) (“Drawing on the work of pioneer conservative
academics like Robert Bork and Raoul Berger, originalism became a central organizing principle for the
Reagan Justice Department’s assault on what it regarded as a liberal federal judiciary.”).
77. See J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 951
(1996) (“It is important to recognize that the picture is somewhat different at non-elite law schools.
Interdisciplinary scholarship has gained less of a foothold there; it is not hegemonic in the way it has
become at some of the fancy schools.”). It is hard to argue that this scholarship is really “hegemonic” at
these schools since most of the scholarship being produced by faculty there is not substantially
interdisciplinary—even though most new faculty might be doing this kind of work.
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thereby making the profession more interested as well.
Casting the net widely by producing integrated scholarship can also
attract scholars of high intellectual status, which can help the field.78 If
renowned scholars are writing about issues related to a particular
jurisprudential movement, then the movement is more likely to attract other
scholars to write about the area and to attract students to take classes in the
area. The movement is also more likely to gain the attention of the profession,
which is more likely to have heard of the professor—and therefore the area—
because of the high status of the professor. Simply put, during the Rise Era
there was much more integrated scholarship about comparative constitutional
law of interest to both academics and legal professionals; during the Fall Era
there was much less.
The prominence of comparative constitutional law was also influenced by
developments in cognate disciplines. Cognate disciplines produce data and
information that legal scholars can then integrate into a more transferable series
of programmatic and practical normative lessons for other scholars and for the
profession. For instance, the revival of constitutional history was sparked in
part by the resurgence of interest in legal history among history departments. It
might be hard to remember now, but Daniel J. Boorstin had it right in 1958
when he called the field of legal history a “Dark Continent.”79 But since then,
“the turn to history”80 has been assisted by the resurgence of legal history in
history departments.81 During the Rise Era, scholars writing about
constitutional law, comparative law, and in political science departments were
all interested in comparative constitutional law. During the Fall Era, almost
none of these fields cared about comparative constitutional law.
This relationship between the professors and the profession is not meant
to exclude the role that larger political and social developments played in the
change from the foreign to the domestic. During the Rise Era, the country in
general was focused more on the rest of the world; during the Fall Era, our
attention turned inward, and that is part of the reason why our law schools did
as well.
A. The Rise Era
1. The Legal Profession and the Rise Era
The American legal profession was fascinated by the rest of the world
during the Rise Era, and once World War II ended, it turned its attention to
legal developments abroad. When it came to comparative constitutional law in
78. See Neil Gross, Becoming a Pragmatist Philosopher: Status, Self-Concept, and
Intellectual Choice, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 52 (2002).
79. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 399 (1958).
80. Kalman, supra note 17, at ch. 5 (discussing the “turn to history” among law professors).
81. See Stephen Botein, Professional History Reconsidered, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 60, 60-66
(1977) (reviewing MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876
(1976), and JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1977)) (discussing how the state of American legal history has “improved markedly” since
Boorstin’s comments).
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particular, the years after World War II were the most active years the world
had ever seen. Samuel Huntington has written about “waves of democracy,”82
but there have also been similar waves of constitutionalism—with the most
substantial one transpiring in the years after World War II. In the first few
decades after World War II constitutional law spread around the world, from
the former Axis powers (Japan in 1947, Italy in 1948, and Germany in 1949),
to the formerly defiantly anti-constitutionalist France (in 1958), and so on.
These developments outside of the United States captured the attention
and commanded the energies of the legal profession inside of the United States.
The profession was intimately involved in what Chief Justice Earl Warren in
1955 called a “revival of comparative jurisprudence.”83 As mentioned before,
Chief Justice Warren traveled the world to give speeches about comparative
constitutional law. He wrote an essay for Fortune Magazine about this burst of
constitutional activity around the world, and noted that “American lawyers are
already taking an active part.”84 Warren wrote essays for a range of law reviews
about the spread of constitutionalism around the world, including for a new
academic publication focused exclusively on comparative law, the American
Journal of Comparative Law.85
He was not alone: Justice Felix Frankfurter, himself born in Austria86 and
a frequent consumer of comparative constitutional law in his opinions,87 wrote
a notable scholarly Foreword—not for the Harvard Law Review, but for the
American Journal of Comparative Law—discussing the historical linkages
between the American Supreme Court and the constitutional discussions of
other countries.88 Justice Douglas wrote a book on the constitutional law of
India.89 Justice Jackson delivered lectures and wrote about comparative
constitutional law.90 The Supreme Court cited comparative constitutional law
with great frequency.91 And it was not just the Supreme Court that was
interested in legal developments in the rest of the world. American judges
hosted visits from foreign constitutional dignitaries in the United States, such as
when Justice Frankfurter and Learned Hand met with visitors from India to
discuss the new Constitution of India.92
Because the profession was interested in the rest of the world, a greater
comparative orientation in law schools naturally followed. Large numbers of

82. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
83. Warren, supra note 3.
84. Id.
85. See Earl Warren, Preface, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1956).
86. HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 4 (1960).
87. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 57, at 839 (noting that Justice Frankfurter, as well as
Justice Breyer, “frequently looked to foreign sources of law for guidance during this period and have
advocated their use”); id. at 840-85 (discussing all of the opinions written by Justice Frankfurter that
reference comparative constitutional law).
88. Felix Frankfurter, Foreword, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1954).
89. DOUGLAS, supra note 6.
90. See Knowles, supra note 7.
91. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 57, at 755-810.
92. B.N. RAU, INDIA’S CONSTITUTION IN THE MAKING 302-08 (1960).
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law professors, before and even during their time teaching, had experience
interacting with the rest of the world. Regardless of whether the average
member of the legal profession had spent time abroad, many of the elite
members of the profession who then became law professors had international
experience. Noted constitutional scholar Paul Carrington of Duke Law School,
who joined the Duke faculty in 1957, served in the U.S. Army during the
Korean War.93 Eugene Rostow, professor at Yale Law School starting in 1937,
and Dean from 1955 until 1965, worked on the Lend-Lease Program in the
State Department and later worked as a policy advisor to Assistant Secretary of
State Dean Acheson.94 Kingman Brewster, hired to teach at Harvard Law
School in 1950 and later the President of Yale University, worked for a year for
the General Counsel of the Office of Special Representative in Europe.95
Between 1954 and 1955, when Harvard hired three tenure-track faculty
members, only one had clerked, while another had served as an ambassador in
Europe from 1950 to 1951.96 In 1964, the one new law professor Stanford hired
had served as a special assistant to an undersecretary of state.97 With
experiences overseas before becoming law professors, it was natural that the
research and pedagogical agenda of law professors at their peak during this
time was focused on the rest of the world.
With all of the constitutional law-related events transpiring around the
world, too, there was certainly plenty of grist for the scholarly mill. Within a
few years, the three theretofore most proudly anti-constitutionalist countries in
the world—Japan, Germany, and Italy—all adopted constitutions, and each
adoption generated a wave of scholarly commentary.98 Law was a central part
in the globally discussed battle over race in South Africa, which prompted
commentaries from Yale Law Professor Grant Gilmore and Harvard Law Dean
Erwin Griswold, among others.99 France created its most substantial
constitution, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, in 1958, prompting an
immediate article in the Harvard Law Review.100
2. The Structure of Scholarship During the Rise Era
During the Rise Era, scholarship on comparative constitutional law

93. See Faculty Profiles: Paul D. Carrington, DUKE LAW, http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/
carrington/cv (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
94. See Todd S. Purdum, Eugene Rostow, 89, Official At State Dept. and Law Dean, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C19; Eugene Rostow Oral History Description, MILLER CENTER FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/oralhistories/detail/2944 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
95. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 1950-1951, at
61 (1950).
96. Milton Katz served as an ambassador and previously had been a professor at Harvard from
1940-1950. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 1955, at 23-24
(1955). David Herwitz and Donald Turner were also hired. Id. at 141, 159, 275.
97. Bayless Manning served in this capacity from 1962-1963. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH.,
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1965, at 237 (1965).
98. See, e.g., Adams & Cappelleti, supra note 29; Deutsch, supra note 28; Friedrich, supra,
note 29; Gellhorn, supra note 29; McWhinney, supra note 29.
99. See Gilmore, supra note 27; Griswold, Coloured Vote, supra note 8.
100. See Friedrich, supra note 29.
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discussed American constitutional law as well, and this scholarship featured
articles by prominent scholars from a range of fields and areas. During the Fall
Era, comparative constitutional law discussed a more specialized range of
topics and featured articles by a more specialized group of scholars.
During the Rise Era, the scholarship that addressed comparative
constitutional law issues touched on a wide range of concerns, thereby creating
interest in comparative constitutional law issues across a large cross-section of
law schools and the legal profession. This comparative constitutional
scholarship that was of use to other law professors and to the profession grew
out of an alliance between two key scholarly factions: the more specialized
comparative constitutional scholars who wrote about the American
constitutional implications of their scholarship, and the more traditionally
American constitutional scholars who integrated comparative information into
their otherwise purely American constitutional law.
The more specialized comparativists writing at the time—scholars like
Karl Loewenstein and Arthur Taylor von Mehren at Harvard, and Edward
McWhinney at Toronto—sometimes wrote articles with non-comparativists,
and they often wrote for a non-comparativist audience. Harvard Law Professor
and later Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Kaplan, for example,
wrote an article about civil procedure and public norms in Germany and
America with von Mehren.101 McWhinney wrote articles about the German
constitutional system and its lessons for the United States.102 This meant that
comparative constitutional law was creating scholarship of relevance to a broad
range of those in law schools and the legal profession.
At the same time, those professors with the greatest reputations as
scholars of American law were writing articles that included discussions of
comparative constitutional law developments. During the Rise Era, Harvard
Law School Dean Erwin Griswold wrote articles with comparative
constitutional themes,103 as did Grant Gilmore104 and Justice Douglas.105 Walter
Gellhorn, the leading administrative law scholar of the time, wrote a series of
articles about comparative administrative and constitutional law.106 Lon Fuller
wrote about the emerging genre of Marxist and constitutional legal theory in
Europe.107 Future General Counsel of the NAACP Jack Greenberg wrote about
the constitutional law of human rights in Europe.108 Other prominent scholars

101. See Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil
Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958).
102. See, e.g., McWhinney, supra note 29.
103. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 27.
105. Douglas, supra note 24.
106. See Walter Gellhorn, Citizens’ Grievances Against Administrative Agencies—The
Yugoslav Approach, 64 MICH. L. REV. 385 (1966); Walter Gellhorn, The Norwegian Ombudsman, 18
STAN. L. REV. 293 (1966); Walter Gellhorn, The Ombudsman in New Zealand, 53 CAL. L. REV. 1155
(1965); Walter Gellhorn, Review of Administrative Acts in the Soviet Union, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1051
(1966); Gellhorn, supra note 29; Gellhorn, supra note 28.
107. See Fuller, supra note 33.
108. See Jack Greenberg & Anthony R. Shalit, New Horizons for Human Rights: The European
Convention, Court, and Commission of Human Rights, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (1963).
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like William Van Alstyne and an elderly Roscoe Pound also wrote about
comparative issues as part of their scholarship.109
These articles also appeared in the nation’s leading law reviews, a feature
of the Rise Era discussed earlier in Part II. The combination of the leading law
professors of all kinds of the time writing in the nation’s leading law reviews
was very helpful for comparative constitutional law. The Dean of Harvard Law
School, Erwin Griswold, wrote about the area for the Harvard Law Review; one
of the leading figures in the history of American law, Roscoe Pound, also wrote
about it for the Harvard Law Review; a symposium on the area in The Yale Law
Journal featured a keynote by a noted scholar and then member of the Supreme
Court, Justice Douglas. This was good for comparative constitutional law. It
should also be noted that political science at the time—unlike during the Fall
Era—was very much interested in comparative constitutional law. There were
many articles on the topic, with information and arguments that could be used
by law professors as part of their Rise Era integrative mission.110
3. The Larger Political Environment
During the Rise Era, even beyond the interests of the profession, the
interests of the country more generally focused on the rest of the world. The
Rise Era lasted from 1945 to 1972, a period when Americans were much more
interested in developments abroad than they would be during the Fall Era.
These general social and political dynamics are particularly important for
constitutional law scholarship and pedagogy in the United States, since
constitutional law in the legal academy tends to be more related to politics in
the United States than independent of it as in Europe.111
At the time that law schools were focusing more and more on
constitutional developments abroad, the country was as well. A few months
before the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,112 the country
was focused intensely on issues related to the rest of the world. When asked by
Gallup what constituted the “most important problem” facing the nation—in a
poll permitting multiple responses to this question—a full fifty-seven percent
answered peace, seventeen percent the atom bomb, sixteen percent
Asia/Korea/Indochina, nine percent war/Russia.113 Domestic concerns rated
very low—things like civil rights rated very low (two percent), and though
economic concerns rated slightly higher (sixteen percent for

109. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, International Law and Interstate River Disputes, 48
CAL. L. REV. 596 (1960); Pound, supra note 29; Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4
AM. J. COMP. L. 70 (1955).
110. See, e.g., Taylor Cole, Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
964 (1959); David Deener, Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1079 (1952).
111. See, e.g., Robert Post, Constitutional Scholarship in the United States, 7 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 416 (2009); Alexander Somek, The Indelible Science of Law, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 424 (2009).
112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. Gallup Org., Gallup Poll #528 (Mar. 17, 1954), available at http://institution.gallup.com/
documents/questionnaire.aspx?study=AIPO0528.
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depression/inflation/recession), they were still far below foreign concerns.114
With occasional and brief exceptions, the country’s focus overseas remained
constant throughout the immediate years to come.115
The country’s international focus was part of the reason the Supreme
Court was not as salient in law schools as it would later become. During the
Rise Era, “the public was more focused on issues as to which the Supreme
Court in particular and constitutional adjudication in general were largely
spectators.”116 This was the era of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis,
and Red China. There was only so much time for the domestic when the
country felt that the foreign threatened its very existence.
Not only was the country focused more on the rest of the world, but the
focus was of a type that encouraged interest in comparative constitutional law.
Simply put, a form of cultural and legal imperialism is good for interest in
comparative constitutional law, for better or for worse. Given the normative
bias of the American law professor, when other countries have constitutional
cultures similar to the United States, explaining the similarities is less
interesting to law professors than pointing out differences and looking for
normative lessons to be gleaned. And the desire to export normative differences
rather than to import them also encourages certain types of comparative legal
scholarship and pedagogy in order to attract the interest of those in power
wishing to export and project American power of all sorts.
Thus it should not be surprising that the Rise Era was an era of greater
American exceptionalism, both inside and outside of the world of the law.
Outside of the world of the law, the Rise Era was the period of the Marshall
Plan and the American encouragement of economic development in Europe. It
was the period of the Truman Doctrine and efforts to protect and encourage
democracies around the world. It was also the period of the Korean and
Vietnam Wars and the projection of American power into remote parts of the
world that had interested the United States only in very minor ways before.
This American exceptionalism found its way into the legal culture’s
treatment of comparative constitutional law. The articles in the new American
Journal of Comparative Law and Erwin Griswold’s Harvard Law Review
essays on comparative constitutional law were often about exporting American
constitutional ideas to the rest of the world. And, notwithstanding some
Supreme Court citations to comparative constitutional law that did not privilege

114. Id.
115. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s
Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 37-38 (2006) (“The reality is that in the 1950s, the
public’s attention was focused less on race and equality than on the Cold War. What concerned—
obsessed—the American people were the foreign policy and defense issues of nuclear disarmament,
relations with the Soviet Union and Red China, the space race, tensions over Quemoy and Matsu, the
Suez crisis, and the Hungarian revolution, among others.”).
116. Id. at 40; see also id. (“Apart from the Court’s intervention in Truman’s seizure of the steel
mills during the Korean War, the Court stayed away from the foreign policy crises of the 1950s and
early 1960s, and in the later 1960s and early 1970s the Court was involved with the Vietnam War only
peripherally, as it dealt repeatedly with questions of protest and occasionally with the issue of
conscription.”).
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the American constitutional experience,117 some of the more notable citations
to comparative constitutional law (in cases like Youngstown) treated the foreign
constitutional experience as the negative role model—the experience to
avoid—and the American constitutional experience as the one to prioritize.118
One way or another, though, the debates around constitutional
imperialism featured discussions of comparative constitutional law. And this
meant that for every Youngstown decrying the constitutional experiences of
other countries, there was a Miranda borrowing from them. One might prefer a
comparative constitutional law that borrows to one that distinguishes, but even
if the constitutional culture during this time featured some anti-borrowing,
exceptionalist ideas, the discussions and interest this triggered were part of the
reason there were more pro-borrowing ideas.
B. The Fall Era
1. The Legal Profession and the Fall Era
a.

Federal Litigation and the Federal Clerkship

When the legal profession was interested in the rest of the world during
the Rise Era, the pedagogy and scholarship of the American law professor
reflected this interest. Law professors came to teaching with their research
agendas shaped by their experiences abroad. The legal profession cultivated
this interest in the rest of the world, and law professors created a brand of
scholarship that kept the legal profession interested in comparative
constitutional scholarship. The story during the Fall Era is different, if more
familiar. The attention of the profession turned toward domestic litigation,
particularly the Warren Court. This turn meant that prominent law professors
came from clerkships on the Warren Court, and the events of the day for law
professors to write about related to the Warren Court. It meant that the
profession was more supportive of scholarship related to the domestic
constitutional issues decided by the Warren Court.
It might appear to everyone today that the legal profession has always
focused on constitutional litigation in the Supreme Court, but that was not
always the case. The interests of the profession turned inward toward domestic
courts (particularly the Supreme Court) starting around the time of the Fall Era.
Due substantially to the Warren Court, the work of the legal profession and of
the Supreme Court became one of the defining national issues of the day, as

117. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488-89 (1966) (considering the experiences of
a range of countries as a source of positive support for the rule announced by the Court).
118. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650-51 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (contrasting the successful American constitutional experience of constraining
emergency power with failed experiences elsewhere). For other examples during this time period using
comparative constitutional law in this manner, see, for instance, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169
(1952) (referencing “English-speaking peoples”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949) (referencing
“the English-speaking world”); and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (referencing “notions of justice of English-speaking people”).
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“Richard Nixon largely ran against the Supreme Court in 1968.”119 While
several decades ago the Supreme Court had been doing very little to gain
attention, now the Court was a major topic during a presidential election.120 As
Newsweek reported about the Warren Court, “For the sheer breadth and depth
of its impact on the life of the nation, its work is unprecedented.”121
And so it was that the profession focused its energies on the process of
domestic litigation, particularly in federal courts, much more than in previous
periods. As the interests of the profession changed, so did the backgrounds of
those who became law professors. The new scholars of the previous generation
had practiced law and served overseas in some capacity. By contrast, during the
Fall Era, clerking for a judge (particularly a federal judge) for the first time
became a broadly recognized status symbol for aspiring elite lawyers and
therefore for potential law professors.122 As early as 1971, one article in the
Harvard Law Review noted that the trend was for “[t]he background[s] of law
professors [to be] strikingly homogeneous; almost all were law review, [and]
many clerked for Supreme Court Justices or other notable judges . . . .”123
Consider the significance of the change: in 1950, Michigan Law School
hired one new tenure-track or tenured professor, and Harvard hired five.124 Of
these six new professors (many of whom became noted legal scholars, like
Louis Jaffe), only one had clerked.125 Between 1954 and 1955, Michigan and
Harvard each hired three new law professors, one of whom had clerked.126 In
1960, out of fourteen new professors among the schools, only one had
clerked.127 In 1975, when Harvard hired three new tenure-track faculty, all
three had clerked.128

119. Frederick Schauer, supra note 115, at 29 n.81; see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J.
185, 192 (1983) (“Richard Nixon’s charge that the Warren Court was soft on crime contributed to his
election in 1968.”).
120. See John P. Frank, Court and Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REV. 400, 400
(1951) (“The affirmative influence of the Court and the Constitution on American life since 1946 has
been very little.”); Friedman, supra note 9, at 178 (“The telling feature of the 1940’s, however, is that
although the issues on the docket held the potential for conflict, the Supreme Court was not doing much
to arouse attention, let alone popular ire.”).
121. The Warren Court: Fateful Decade, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1964, at 24.
122. See William E. Nelson et al., The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its
Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2009).
123. Alan Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 403 (1971).
124. Michigan hired Roy L. Steinheimer. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF
TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 1950-1951, at 28, 293, 302 (1950). Harvard hired Kingman Brewster,
William Hardee, Louis Leventhal Jaffe, and Arthur Sutherland. See id. at 18-19, 61, 140, 163, 299-300.
125. Arthur Sunderland clerked for Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1927-1928. Id. at 300.
126. Michigan hired Alfred Conrad and Richard Wellman. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH.,
DIRECTORY OF TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 1955, at 38, 86-87, 284 (1955). Harvard hired David
Herwitz and Donald Turner, who clerked for Thomas Clark on the Supreme Court. Id. at 23-24, 141,
275. Milton Katz also rejoined the Harvard faculty in 1955. He had served as a professor at Harvard
from 1940-1950. See id. at 23, 159.
127. Frank E.A. Sander at Harvard clerked for Judge Macgruder and Judge Frankfurter. See
ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1960, at 31-32, 37, 289 (1960).
128. These faculty were Douglas Ginsburg, Sally Neely, see ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH.,
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1975 SUPPLEMENT, at 43-44, 122, 150 (1975), and Hal Scott, see ASS’N
OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1976, at 850 (1976).
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The new law professors hired during the Fall Era, then, were more likely
to have been law clerks during notable periods for notable federal judges and
Supreme Court Justices. They were “[m]embers of a new generation who went
to law school during the Warren Court years and entered law teaching[,] . . . a
group that included Jesse Choper, Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, John
Hart Ely, Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, and Laurence Tribe.”129 Each one of
these scholars had one biographical detail in common: a clerkship for at least
one prominent judge after graduating and before teaching. Choper130 and Ely131
clerked for Chief Justice Warren; Ackerman for Henry Friendly and Justice
Harlan;132 Dworkin for Learned Hand;133 Fiss for Thurgood Marshall and
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.;134 Michelman for Brennan;135 and Tribe for
Justice Potter Stewart.136 These clerkships were the gold star that the profession
valued and that helped members of this generation land their teaching jobs. The
new intellectual mandarins were hired not after they had experiences in the
world, but rather after and no doubt in substantial part because of their
experiences in the federal courts as law clerks.
And these clerkships had a profound impact on the careers of these future
leaders of legal pedagogy and scholarship. Ely wrote the defining scholarly
book of the time to justify the work of the Warren Court, in that book saying of
Warren that “you don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”137
Michelman wrote an entire book dedicated to articulating Justice Brennan’s
constitutional philosophy.138 Those who had clerked for and wrote about the
Warren Court, from either a supportive or critical perspective, authored the
most cited scholarship of the time. This influential scholarship was about the
Court,139 showing that constitutional law was becoming more clearly
predominant than perhaps ever before.140

129. STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 44 (2008) (quoting
LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 50 (1996)).
130. Faculty Profiles: Jesse H. Choper, BERKELEY LAW, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/phpprograms/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=19 (last viewed Nov. 1, 2010).
131. John Hart Ely, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.miami.edu/
facadmin/jely.php (last viewed Nov. 1, 2010).
132. Bruce Arnold Ackerman, Curriculum Vitae (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/Faculty/Ackerman_CV.pdf.
133. Ronald Dworkin, U. OF OKLA. DEPARTMENT OF POL. SCI., http://www.ou.edu/cas/psc/
dworkin.htm (last viewed Nov. 1, 2010).
134. Curriculum Vitae: Owen Fiss, YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/
fisscurriculumvitae.htm (last viewed Nov. 1, 2010).
135. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1970, at 331 (1970).
136. Id. at 459.
137. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, at v
(1980) (dedicating his book to Warren).
138. FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
139. On one list of the most cited articles of all time, for instance, four of the five most cited
articles are related to a decision by the Warren Court. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1549 tbl.1 (1985) (listing articles by Gerald Gunther, Herbert Wechsler,
Charles Reich, and John Hart Ely as among the five most cited articles of all time); see also Mark
Tushnet, Justification in Constitutional Adjudication: A Comment on Constitutional Interpretation, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1707, 1709 (1994) (discussing “the most basic characteristic of constitutional
scholarship—it is oriented to Supreme Court decisions”).
140. See Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood

26

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36: 1

On the demand side, the interests of the law students who later became
the law professors and the members of the profession—and who were the law
review editors selecting articles to be published—changed as well. One survey
of entering law students found that those who went to law school to work to
pursue “civil rights or civil liberties work” quadrupled between 1960 and
1975.141 The editors of The Yale Law Journal wrote that Earl Warren “made us
all proud to be lawyers.”142 The editors of the Harvard Law Review dedicated
an issue to the Warren Court, writing: “To Chief Justice Earl Warren, who with
courage and compassion led a reform of the law while the other branches of
government delayed, the editors respectfully dedicate this issue.”143
With the focus then on litigation in American federal courts, the degree to
which these courts paid attention to the teaching and scholarship of American
law professors became a real sign of status for these academics. As Pierre
Schlag has written, “[L]egal academics could understand themselves to be
doing something important because they understood themselves to be important
to the work of judges who in turn were portrayed by legal academics as very
important.”144 Charles Reich from Yale introduced a new theory of property
rights in his articles,145 and noted proudly that the Warren Court cited his article
in Goldberg v. Kelly.146 Status came from recognition not just by the
profession—as was always the case—but by the new institutions of
significance to the profession, the American federal courts.
b. Comparative Constitutional Law and International Law
A large part of the fall of comparative constitutional law during the Fall
Era also relates to the rise of international law. During the same time that
comparative constitutional law was declining in law schools, international law
was rising—and very much because of increased interest by the elite
profession. This interest in international law came in part because it was
another source of legal argument to use to support activities related to federal
litigation. After all, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “all Treaties
made . . . under the Authority of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law
and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 318 (2002) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000)) (“The Warren Court vaulted constitutional law
scholars to the head of the legal pecking order. Legal luminaries during the first half of the twentieth
century, Roscoe Pound . . . Karl Llewellyn . . . and others, are best known for their writings on common
law subjects. The most celebrated work of legal scholarship during the decades before the Second World
War, Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), is devoted almost entirely to how
justices make decisions in nonconstitutional cases. Legal luminaries during the second half of the
twentieth century are best known for their constitutional analysis.”).
141. Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 579-90 (1973).
142. The Editors, Dedication, 84 YALE L.J. 405 (1975).
143. The Editors, Dedication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1969).
144. Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 420 (1992).
145. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
146. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Charles A. Reich, Commentary on Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) and Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965), in Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles
from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1465 (1991).
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of the Land . . . and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”147 When
the Second Circuit decided Filártiga v. Peña-Irala148 in 1980, and the D.C.
Circuit decided Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic149 just a few years later,
there was more explicit, clear, and prominent judicial authorization for the idea
that many of the central legal battles of the time could not only be litigated in
federal court, but could be litigated using international law. Amnesty
International and the ACLU started to bring cases raising issues related to how
domestic federal courts might address international legal issues.150 One of the
primary government offices entrusted with representing the government in
these cases, the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, increased in size and
prominence during this time and employed many young lawyers who would go
on to become a new wave of professors of international law.151 As international
law became a topic of interest, in substantial part because it was a topic of
interest for federal litigation, law schools began to devote increasingly greater
attention to that area. Around the same time Filártiga and Tel-Oren were
decided, law schools started to create international human rights clinics.152
These clinics proliferated in the late 1980s and early 1990s.153 The number of
law reviews focusing substantially on international law increased from less than
fifteen in 1972 to more than seventy thirty years later.154 Scholars started to
write about international law in much greater amounts during the Fall Era, and
new and important theories were introduced. These included, most notably,
Harold Koh’s theories of transnational legal process,155 and Yale’s important
new Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic worked on issues similar to
Koh’s theories.156 Indeed, today it is hard to imagine a major law school not
having at least one faculty member focusing primarily on international law in
his or her scholarship and teaching. Nonetheless, it is fair to state that most law
schools have no one writing and teaching about comparative constitutional
law—or comparative law in general, for that matter.
This rise of international law had much to do with the fall of comparative
constitutional law. There is only so much scholarly and pedagogical oxygen to
147. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
148. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
149. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
150. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Convenes First National
Conference on the Use of International Human Rights Law in the U.S. Justice System (Oct. 8, 2003),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/human-rights/aclu-convenes-first-national-conference-useinternational-human-rights-law-us-justice-s.
151. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010).
152. See Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human
Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 525 (2003).
153. See Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human
Rights Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530 n.15 (2004).
154. See Donna E. Arzt & Anna G. Kaminska, From Soviets to Saddam: Introduction to the
Thirtieth Anniversary Symposium, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 181, 185 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) [hereinafter Koh,
Transnational Litigation].
156. Harold Hongju Koh, Democracy and Human Rights in the United States Foreign Policy?:
Lessons from the Haitian Crisis, 48 SMU L. REV. 189, 190 (1994).
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go around, and much of it was being absorbed by the focus on domestic federal
litigation. The oxygen that was going to non-American legal materials was
increasingly going to international law. Comparative constitutional law was an
obvious competitor to international law, particularly international human rights
law. Both areas of law had much to say about the major legal issues of the
day—civil liberties and public law issues. Just as international law had answers
to questions about how far governments should protect the freedom of speech,
so too did the domestic constitutions of other countries. But why, then, did
international law surpass comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era?
One reason that this attention was going to international law and not to
comparative constitutional law was that international law was speaking to the
elite profession in a way that comparative constitutional law simply was not,
and the profession was interested in international law in a way that it was not
interested in comparative constitutional law. Article VI may have established
international law as a source of binding domestic law in the late nineteenth
century, and the Alien Tort Claims Act may have followed suit,157 but it was
really cases like Filártiga and Tel-Oren that opened the door to American
lawyers and American courts spending more and more time on international
law-related litigation in American federal courts.
The law professors who revitalized international law during this time
came from a profession more and more interested in international law—in
particular as a source for American federal litigation. Thus, their backgrounds
and their scholarship furthered this interest in international law as an area of
interest on its own, but in particular as a source of legal argument in American
federal courts. The new hires teaching international law had practiced for these
human rights groups bringing international law cases in federal court or had
worked for the Legal Adviser’s Office on these issues. Once in teaching, these
professors’ scholarship focused on the relevance of international law to federal
courts deciding federal cases. The leading scholarship related to international
law deals with these issues,158 and the leading scholars are very much involved
with federal litigation. Harold Koh of Yale Law School is now the Legal
Adviser in the Obama administration and is sometimes mentioned as a
candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court.159 Koh is assisted by Sarah Cleveland of
Columbia Law School (who writes on similar issues160), and a law professor
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
158. Note that, for instance, those on the list of most-cited legal scholars who write about
international law tend to write about it from this perspective. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Legal
Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409 (2000). On Shapiro’s list, Louis Henkin is the highest ranked scholar
whose work focuses on international law, see id. at 424 n.6, and Henkin’s most important piece of
scholarship was about the role of international law in federal litigation in the American federal courts,
see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1996). One federal judge noted that
Henkin was important precisely because “[h]e has taught international law to over 300 judges who have
attended the Aspen Institute’s Justice and Society program, and more specifically, the international law
seminars at Wye.” Judge Rosemary Barkett, Louis Henkin and the Education of the Federal Judiciary,
38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 473 (2000).
159. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, Ten Picks for Obama’s Supreme Court, SALON (Nov. 18, 2008),
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/11/18/supreme_court.
160. See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1533 (1998) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance A.
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and leading scholar of international law (Anne-Marie Slaughter161) can even be
found running the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning.
This is not just a liberal phenomenon. During the second Bush
administration, Curtis Bradley of Duke Law School worked on these issues.162
Jack Goldsmith, head of the Office of Legal Counsel (not technically an
international law position), made his scholarly name in part for his writings on
international law in domestic courts163 and coauthored a casebook on Foreign
Relations Law with Bradley.164 After all, one of the major legal debates over
the past decade has been about international law and its role in American
federal courts—namely, whether the Geneva Conventions are “quaint”165 or
still relevant in the era of the war on terror. A career in practice and scholarship
characterized by experience in leading legal positions and citations in the
leading legal debates of the day provide academics with enormous status in law
teaching, and thus it is no surprise that international law scholars have focused
on these activities and have been rewarded with influence in ways that
comparative constitutional law scholars have not.
It is hard for comparative constitutional law to compete with this. It is
true that, during some periods more than others, the Supreme Court has cited to
comparative constitutional law in major cases,166 indicating that comparative
constitutional law could be just as relevant as international law in American
federal litigation. This was particularly true during the Rise Era, and these
citations declined during the Fall Era. Even given that, though, while
international law is the “supreme Law of the Land” under Article VI of the
Constitution, and Congress has the authority to punish “offenses against the law
of nations,”167 there is no similar constitutional authority for discussing
comparative constitutional law. This is not South Africa, whose Constitution
discusses not only international law but also comparative constitutional law.168
Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996)).
161. For examples of her leading scholarly works, see, for instance, ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER,
A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of
International Law is Domestic, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL LAW 110 (Andre Nolkaemper & Janne Nijman eds., 2007); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (2000); and Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence R.
Helfer, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 899 (2005).
162. For examples of Bradley’s scholarship in this area, see, for instance, Curtis Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); and Curtis Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
163. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617
(1997); Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Law, and International Relations Theory, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 959 (2000).
164. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2009).
165. See Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Speaks Against Torture During Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2005, at A1.
166. See generally Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 57 (discussing the various periods during
which the Supreme Court has cited comparative constitutional law in interpreting the Constitution).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
168. Even the Constitution of South Africa, in its section 39, states that courts “must consider
international law” and “may consider foreign law.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39 (emphasis added).
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Now that lawyers and judges and scholars have recognized its relevance,
international law has surged ahead and pushed comparative constitutional law
aside.
It is interesting to note as well that during the Fall Era American law
schools’ study of international law opened their eyes to diversity, as did the
changing composition of the student body and faculties at law schools. The Fall
Era was essentially the same period when female and minority law students
started to enroll in American law schools in larger numbers, and then
eventually to teach in American law schools in larger numbers. For instance, in
1964 there were only about three hundred first-year black students in the entire
nation, and about 100 of them were enrolled at historically black law
schools.169 Barely one percent of law students were black.170 Nearly forty years
later, almost eight percent of law students were black.171 In 1965-1966, women
comprised about four percent of law students, and now they are about half.172
This affected the composition of law faculties as well. Lani Guinier became the
first tenured African-American female member of the faculty at Harvard Law
School in 1998.173
This increasing diversity domestically, however, did not coincide with an
increasing interest in diversity as viewed through a global lens, as I have
written about elsewhere.174 There certainly was a greater recognition of the
ways in which law was specific to particular cultures and places, as well as the
notion that viewing law from the perspective of different communities and
places could make a difference. This insight was part of what led to critical race
studies and legal feminism, but these movements largely focused on domestic
legal issues. There was very little in the way of scholarship about how different
countries deal with race, even among the leading lights of critical race studies.
In the rest of the university, this increasing campus diversity led to questions
about universality that triggered domestic doubts (postmodernism, for example)
and comparative attention (increasing area studies requirements). By contrast,
in law schools this increasing campus diversity led to questions about
universality that triggered almost exclusively domestic doubts (like critical
legal studies).
2. The Structure of Scholarship During the Fall Era
At the same time that the attention of the profession changed, the nature
of the scholarship of those writing about comparative constitutional law
169. See Richard A. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action, 53 STAN. L. REV. 367,
375 (2004).
170. See id.
171. See Minority Enrollment 1971-2002, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
statistics/minstats.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
172. Lee E. Teitelbaum, First-Generation Issues: Access to Law School, ASS’N OF AM. LAW
SCH., http://www.aals.org/diversity/teitelba.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
173. Lani Guinier Home Page, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
directory/index.html?id=24 (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
174. See David Fontana, American Law Schools, Meet the World, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
May 26, 2006, at B10.
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changed as well. Part of the reason that law reviews went decades between
publishing articles about comparative constitutional law during the Fall Era—
while earlier they published several articles per issue—is the changing nature
of the comparative constitutional scholarship being produced. Comparative
constitutional scholarship became more specialized. Moreover, there were
essentially no substantial articles about comparative constitutional law written
by prominent American constitutional scholars during the entire Fall Era.
During the Rise Era, there were many articles each year by famous
American constitutionalists who were not really comparative constitutional
scholars, such as Lon Fuller and Erwin Griswold. During the Fall Era, law
reviews instead were full of discussions of litigation in American federal
courts—of the issues presented by those cases, of the judges deciding those
cases, and of the scholars writing about the judges deciding those cases.
Starting in 1975, for a twenty-year period, both The Yale Law Journal and the
Harvard Law Review had at least one issue per year featuring articles
celebrating the career of a famous federal judge and a scholar writing about the
famous cases decided by the Warren Court.
During the Fall Era, the literature about comparative constitutional law
was written by those with an exclusive interest in comparative issues, not
American issues. These articles were published in specialized journals like the
American Journal of Comparative Law or the literally hundreds of other
specialized comparative and international law journals created during that
time.175 Cognate disciplines also changed. Comparative law became more
focused on private law,176 and political science stopped writing about law and
constitutions and explicitly disavowed analysis of institutions and rules177—the
precise subject that law professors study.
In other words, at the moment the profession became keenly interested in
developments in American law and American courts, the scholars they were
most likely to read were writing only about American law and American
courts, and comparativists were not writing much at all about American law
and American courts. Examples abound. During the Rise Era, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg spent time in and coauthored a casebook about Sweden178 and wrote
articles about the comparative constitutional treatment of gender.179 During the
Fall Era, the ACLU tapped her to write the brief for the appellant in an

175. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law
Reviews, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 813, 814 (1999).
176. See BASIL MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE GERMAN LAW OF TORT
22 (1986) (noting how comparative law scholars write more about “unpolitical” areas of private law).
177. The most remarkable document is the statement by the editors of the leading comparative
political science journal, in its first issue, expressing “skepticism about the value of institutional and
legal analysis.” Bernard E. Brown, John H. Herz & Arnold A. Rogow, A Statement by the Editors, 1
COMP. POL. 1 (1968).
178. See RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN
(1965).
179. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Status of Women, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (1972).
Professor Ginsburg, now Justice Ginsburg, also coauthored a casebook on sex discrimination that
incorporated comparative constitutional materials. KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, RUTHER BADER GINSBURG
& HERMA HILL KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXTS, CASES & MATERIALS (1974).
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important domestic constitutional law case before the Supreme Court, Reed v.
Reed.180 During the Rise Era, Erwin Griswold wrote about South African
judicial decisions, discussed Australian legal education, and created the
comparative law program at Harvard Law School.181 During the Fall Era, first
as Solicitor General and later in private practice, he appeared before the Warren
and Burger Courts arguing American constitutional law cases.182
3. The Larger Political Environment
Just as the attention of the country was focused overseas during the Rise
Era, during the Fall Era the attention of the country began to shift to domestic
issues. The Rise Era ended in 1972, the year of Richard Nixon’s reelection and
the first mobilization for and counter-mobilization against the Great Society
and the War on Poverty. With the American withdrawal from Vietnam, there
was no major American military effort overseas until the first Gulf War in
1991. Stagflation and the oil crisis of the 1970s gave way to the recession of the
first term of the Reagan administration and the continuing domestic focus it
caused. The “moral majority” that Nixon relied upon was focused on domestic
affairs, and, as polls at the time showed, public concern in general centered on
these issues.183
Likewise, the cultural and legal imperialism of the earlier period gave
way to a more balanced view of foreign constitutional experiences.
Constitutional scholars were no longer writing about the failures of the foreign
experience and the triumphs of the domestic one. The few articles in the
American Journal of Comparative Law on comparative constitutional topics
highlighted the similarities between the rest of the world and the American
constitutional experience. A few articles talked about constitutional lessons for
the United States, an endeavor less likely to succeed than the exporting model
of comparative constitutional law practiced earlier. This was the era of
postmodernism and cultural relativism, not cultural imperialism.
IV. THE COSTS OF THE FALL OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Why should the rise and fall of comparative constitutional law be of
particular concern? For one thing, the field of scholarship that comparative
constitutional law was part of—and later was in part replaced by—is a field of
scholarship particularly reliant on the type of factual insights that comparative
experience could have potentially and particularly provided. Many of the most
significant developments in American constitutional law in the past half
century could have been foreseen if the time had been taken to look at

180. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see also Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 12, at 1371
(discussing the selection of Ginsburg to argue Reed).
181. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
182. See Dennis Hevesi, Erwin Griswold Is Dead at 90; Served as A Solicitor General, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at B10.
183. See Schauer, supra note 115, at 41 (“And as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s . . . [there
were] worries about inflation, the cost of living, crime, and employment.”).
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constitutional experiences abroad. Another reason that the disappearance of
comparative constitutional law was consequential is that it will now be difficult
to piece the field back together. An entire infrastructure, encouraged by the
actions of our courts, was built to support the development of domestic
constitutional litigation. The creation of this infrastructure, to the almost
complete neglect of an infrastructure for comparative constitutional law (or
many parts of foreign law more generally), makes it that much harder to create
a comparative constitutional law infrastructure now. The major scholarly
change that happened between the Rise and the Fall Eras is, in some ways,
irreversible. The domestic litigation infrastructure encouraged by the Warren
Court meant that research, resources, and social movements have all been
created to support domestic constitutional litigation—and not anything else.
This also has had negative consequences for the core institution of American
judicial review, which is now dependent on a narrow range of domestic law
arguments to justify its very existence.
A. The Costs to American Constitutional Scholarship
1. The Methodology of American Constitutional Scholarship
One reason why American constitutional scholarship has suffered from
the absence of comparative constitutional scholarship is because of the kinds of
arguments that American constitutional scholarship predominately makes:
arguments based at least in part on assumptions about how the world actually
operates. American constitutional scholarship is, as Robert Merton would
describe it, “middle-range theory.”184 To be sure, there are scholars interested
in what Sanford Levinson has called “meta-constitutional theory” as opposed to
“constitutional theory.”185 These scholars make arguments about constitutional
law purely on normative legal theory (based either on first principles of
jurisprudence, or on traditional legal sources like text) rather than empirical
reality. But this is the exception, and the almost universal rule is that American
constitutional scholarship includes arguments about the effects of rules or
institutional arrangements on empirical reality.
This should not be surprising, since the decisions of the Supreme Court
cases that dominate the attention of so many American constitutional law
scholars themselves are exercises in middle-range theory. When the Supreme
Court addresses the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action
programs, for example, it considers whether such programs “are [actually]
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”186 Regardless
of whether courts should be referencing comparative constitutional sources,

184. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39 (1968).
185. Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to Whom,
Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 398 (1992) (defining constitutional meta-theory
scholarship as “writing about ‘first-order’ theorists from a ‘second-order’ perspective . . . . [T]hey seek
to analyze and structure contending constitutional theories, for what they tell us about the enterprise of
engaging in the practice of constitutional analysis.”).
186. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).

34

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 36: 1

there are many good reasons to think that scholarship about constitutional
law—so much affected by these middle-range concerns—could consider
comparative sources across all different types of issues. Since nearly ninety
percent of the countries in the world now have some form of constitutional
review, comparative constitutional law potentially offers enormous amounts of
factual information, information that is particularly relevant because
constitutional scholars make arguments based on facts.
Not only is comparative constitutional experience methodologically
relevant to American constitutional scholarship given its arguments, but there is
also plenty of comparative constitutional law, in terms of relevance and sheer
amount. Indeed, it might be a bold statement, but it is a true one: for every
major American constitutional issue, there is some relevant comparative
constitutional experience that either predated or postdated the American
constitutional experience. We have tiers of scrutiny, and the rest of the world
has proportionality.187 We have the “living constitution,”188 and Canada has the
“living tree.”189 Abram Chayes wrote about impact litigation190 but was
advocating an approach to justice that the Indian Supreme Court was trying at
around the same time.191 It might be true that “we are all realists now,”192 and
because of that it is certainly true that almost all of us should be comparative
constitutionalists now. If any American constitutional scholar advocates an
approach based on predictions about how the world will operate in response, it
is essential to study all available information related to that approach. There
will almost always be directly relevant and intellectually accessible
comparative information that would “cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem,”193 and almost
all constitutional scholarship makes arguments about such consequences. In
this way, almost all American constitutional scholarship could and should be
informed by comparative constitutional law.
This is particularly true given how long and how much scholars have
been discussing constitutional issues in the United States. Even apparently new
187. See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 367 (2009) (noting
the similarities between tiers of scrutiny and proportionality doctrines); see also District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Contrary to the majority’s unsupported
suggestion that this sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied it in
various constitutional contexts, including election-law cases, speech cases, and due process cases.”
(citation omitted)); DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159, 171-76 (2004) (noting the
universality of the proportionality doctrine).
188. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976).
189. See Edwards v. Attorney-General for Can., [1930] A.C. 124 [136] (P.C.) (appeal taken
from S.C.C.) (first introducing this metaphor into Canadian constitutional law).
190. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
191. See Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis Roux, Courts, Rights and Social
Transformation: Concluding Reflections, in COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR 255, 266 (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo
& Theunis Roux eds., 2006).
192. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1985).
193. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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constitutional ideas in the United States might not be truly novel, since the
American ideas are so thickly and deeply embedded in the history and practice
of the United States that they only allow for narrowly original claims. From the
Federalist Papers, to James Wilson’s Lectures on Law and Joseph Story’s
Commentaries on the Constitution, to James Bradley Thayer’s The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,194 scholarly writing
about American constitutional scholarship goes back several hundred years.
This may make it difficult to come up with truly new ideas or arguments, and
even novel ideas are often constrained by the effect of this long history and
practice of American constitutional writing.
It is notable, for instance, how many major pieces of constitutional
scholarship in the past several decades have been affected by the touchstone
American debate on originalism that emerged in the 1980s. Even scholars
unsympathetic to originalism, like Bruce Ackerman, still write books about the
Founding legacy in the midst of making otherwise new and provocative
arguments.195 Ackerman’s idea of “dualist democracy” might be novel, but
imagine how much more novel it would have been if it were less influenced by
a constitutional culture moving in an originalist direction.
As an example of the methodology of American constitutional
scholarship and how comparative constitutional law is relevant—because of its
methodology and because of the usefulness of comparative insight—consider
the debate over the proper role for American courts in constitutional
adjudication. Scholars have long been “preoccupied with the antidemocratic
nature of judicial review,”196 Barry Friedman has termed this debate the
“obsession” that dominates American constitutional scholarship.197 Some have
written to deny that this “difficulty” even exists.198
The leading attempts to respond to this difficulty (and the most cited
articles in the history of American legal scholarship199) involve a focus on
different procedural options that courts have at their disposal to mitigate the
interference with the democratic process that their decisions might create. This
“procedural response” literature, the work of Bickel, Guido Calabresi, Sunstein,
and others, is meant to propose a series of techniques to minimize the impact of
judicial decisions. But these scholars have largely missed the comparative
experience with their suggested procedural responses and so have entirely
missed the ways in which these responses have actually led to more judicial

194. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
195. Ackerman has been known for his liberal perspective on legal issues, in particular related
to some of the debates about originalism. See Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99
YALE L.J. 1419 (1990) (book review). Yet he still relies on originalist evidence in much of his writing.
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
196. Neal Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1998).
197. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 155.
198. For good examples of these arguments, see, for instance, Bruce Ackerman, Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); and Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
199. Shapiro, supra note 139, at 1549 (featuring several of the leading articles from this debate
among the most cited articles in the history of American legal scholarship).
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power—in the United States and elsewhere—rather than less.
The notion that American constitutional scholars addressing procedural
responses to the countermajoritarian difficulty might consider comparative
experience is not revolutionary. Indeed, the first substantial scholarly
contribution to the debate, James Bradley Thayer’s The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,200 was itself probably the first
important comparative constitutional law article published in an American law
review. Thayer was, as the article’s title suggests, discussing the (distinctively)
American doctrine of constitutional law. This was not mere rhetoric, as Thayer
spent substantial parts of his otherwise short article discussing comparative
constitutional law regarding judicial review. Thayer discussed the practice of
France, Germany, Switzerland, Colombia, and the United Kingdom.201 During
the Rise Era, there were many other articles that discussed the proper role for
American courts by referencing comparative constitutional experience.202
During the Fall Era, though, as the proper role for courts in constitutional
cases became a major issue during the Warren Court and going forward, much
of the comparative dimension of the discussion disappeared. Consider, for
instance, the hugely important and insightful scholarship of Guido Calabresi,
himself one of the most informed scholars about comparative legal
developments more generally.203 Calabresi transformed the debate about the
proper role for courts in constitutional cases, first through his Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures and book204 and then through his Harvard Law Review
Foreword.205 Calabresi argued that courts should have the power to force
legislatures to take a “second look” at problematic laws.206 A central element of
his argument for this second-look doctrine was the actual relationship that it
would create between courts and the other branches of government. Calabresi
argued that this second-look doctrine would meet resistance from the other
branches of government but would prompt them meaningfully to reconsider
their decisions without courts overwhelming them or interfering with them too
much.207
Although he was making empirical arguments, Calabresi did not consider
the full range of empirical resources that would help him validate his
200. Thayer, supra note 194.
201. Id. at 130, 136-37 n.1. Thayer was otherwise interested in comparative legal issues. See,
e.g., James Bradley Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1895).
202. See, e.g., Edward McWhinney, Judicial Positivism in Australia: The Communist Party
Case, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 36 (1953); McWhinney, supra note 29; Arthur T. von Mehren,
Constitutionalism in Germany: The First Decision of the New Constitutional Court, 1 AM. J. COMP. L.
70 (1952); Arthur von Mehren, The Judicial Process: A Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 197
(1956).
203. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Policy Goals of the “Swedish Alternative,” 34 AM. J. COMP. L.
657 (1986).
204. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
205. Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the BorkBrennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991).
206. Id. at 104 (“When the legislature has acted with haste or hiding in a way that arguably
infringes even upon the penumbra of fundamental rights, courts should invalidate the possibly offending
law and force the legislature to take a ‘second look’ with the eyes of the people on it.”).
207. Id. at 80.
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predictions and expectations. To his credit, Calabresi did discuss some
comparative constitutional experiences, a rarity among the scholars during the
Fall Era. In his Holmes Lectures and in his book, he did so just in passing, but
in his Harvard Law Review Foreword, he discusses comparative experience in
greater detail.208 His discussion of the comparative material, though, only
highlights some different forms of judicial review, and does not address the
empirical lessons related to his second-look proposal to be drawn from other
countries. At the time, there were already several foreign constitutional
provisions and experiences very similar to Calabresi’s second-look procedure
that suggested that legislatures would not reconsider their laws even if judicial
decisions used a second-look approach. The most prominent debate at the time
was about the second-look doctrine in Canada, whose experience suggested
that legislatures would defer to courts even when those courts invite the
legislature to reconsider their laws.209 Going back several decades, both
Germany and Italy also had substantial experiences with second-look doctrines
(often called “admonitory powers”), and there legislatures still generally
deferred to courts even when invited to reconsider.210 Even when scholars make
comparative references, then, sometimes they might not fully consider the
empirical lessons to be drawn from them.

208. Id. at 124-30.
209. Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which became the official
Canadian “Constitution” in 1982, is a provision granting courts a second-look power. See Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c. 33 (U.K.). Even before section 33, there were already analogues to his second-look
doctrine in place in Canada, at the federal level via the Canadian Bill of Rights, see R.S.C. 1985, app.
III, s. 2, and in the provinces via the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, see R.S.S., c. S-24.1, s. 44, the
Alberta Bill of Rights, see R.S.A. 2000, c. A-14, s. 2, and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 52. Even in the face of the second-look doctrine, legislatures still deferred
enormously to courts. See Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative
Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 288-92 (1995).
210. See Wiltraut Rupp-v.Brünneck, Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts, 20 AM. J.
COMP. L. 387, 395-99 (1972). The German phrase for admonitory decisions is Appellentscheidung. For
the use of this phrase in the Italian context, see Vincenzo Vigoriti, Italy: The Constitutional Court, 20
AM. J. COMP. L. 404, 406-08 (1972). In Germany, the legislature has usually responded immediately by
implementing the judicial decision using the second-look doctrine rather than reconsidering its initial
decisions. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 61 n.117 (1989) (giving an example of a case involving the constitutionality of
discrimination based on the illegitimacy of a child). Even when legislatures have ignored these
admonitory decisions, they still have not created a dialogue because the German Federal Constitutional
Court would simply issue another decision after its earlier decision had been ignored and compel the
legislatures to comply. See Vigoriti, supra, at 409 (“Later the Court, faced with clear parliamentary
disregard of an explicit warning, was compelled to take further action.”). Other countries have
experimented with versions of these admonitory powers. In Austria, the Constitutional Court will
sometimes invalidate a law but then delay publication for up to a year to permit the political branches to
respond to the decision. See William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial SelfRestraint: Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 12
n.35 (1999). The Italian Constitutional Court sometimes does the same. See Vigoriti, supra, at 410. The
South Korean Constitutional Court has similar powers, see Tom Ginsburg, The Constitutional Court and
the Judicialization of Korean Politics, in NEW COURTS IN ASIA 145, 147-48 (Andrew Harding &
Penelope Nicholson eds., 2010), as does the Turkish Constitutional Court, see MAURO CAPPELLETTI,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 89 (1971).
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2. Alternatives to Comparative Constitutional Scholarship
Some of the criticisms levied against procedural response scholars for
neglecting comparative constitutional law could also be levied against them for
neglecting other sources of insight as well. For instance, perhaps Calabresi
would have realized that the second-look doctrine would not create true
dialogue and that legislatures would be very deferential to courts if he had read
the political science research of James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira
about “positivity bias.” This scholarship shows how people’s impressions of
courts are more favorable the more they are exposed to them, thereby
explaining why courts tend to overwhelm other branches of government.211 Or
one could look at American constitutional history, as Calabresi did, for
“antecedents and roots” to this second-look doctrine.212 There certainly are
many American Supreme Court cases employing something like the secondlook doctrine, as an enormous (302-page) article by Dan Coenen full of
examples demonstrates.213 The federal Declaratory Judgment Act also grants
courts powers similar to the powers that Calabresi envisions courts having as
part of his second-look doctrine.214 There is also experience similar to popular
constitutionalism from American constitutional history.215 With all of this
available information, why look at comparative constitutional law in particular?
There is no reason to examine comparative constitutional law exclusively,
or perhaps even primarily or to the exclusion of these other sources of research
insight. Many of the concerns voiced in this Article about the absence of
attention to comparative constitutional law can and have been raised, for
equally valid reasons, about the absence of scholarly attention to history,216
political science,217 or other sources of insight. But there are also reasons to
believe that comparative constitutional law, if not the only source of insight,
might be a particularly helpful one.

211. See JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009). There
are similar articles in comparative political science about constitutional courts elsewhere, reaching
similar conclusions. See Jeffrey K. Staton, Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case
Results, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 98 (2006); Georg Vanberg, Establishing Judicial Independence in West
Germany: The Impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers, 32 COMP. POL. 333 (2000).
212. CALABRESI, supra note 204, ch. 2; see also Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 733
(1984) (employing a similar technique to that of the Italian Court); Nardini, supra note 210, at 26 n.11
(discussing admonitory powers exercised by the Italian Constitutional Court, noting that one example of
those powers “is not completely foreign to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” and
discussing a case that Calabresi discusses, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)).
213. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2001) (noting that
the author provides examples of “structural review,” which Calabresi “reflected extensively on” earlier);
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) (discussing similar ideas in
their American and comparative forms).
214. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
215. See Mark V. Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781,
2783 (2003) (“Departmentalism . . . was a reasonable description of constitutional practice for much of
the nineteenth century.”).
216. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
217. See Graber, supra note 140.
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One reason why this might be the case is the type of evidence produced
by comparative constitutional research. Particularly when it is in the form of
integrated scholarship, comparative constitutional scholarship and experience
may be easier for American law professors to understand than other sources of
insight. There are cultural literacy reasons for academics to care about
comparative constitutional scholarship, for sure, but those might not be the
most important reasons for them to read about comparative constitutional law.
Instead, comparative constitutional law might be relevant to scholars because it
can generate new ideas and can also be a form of “social science on the cheap.”
Empirical evidence of the sort mostly provided in pure social science articles
can be difficult for law professors to understand. The same is true of the
technical language and methodology of history scholarship. Comparative
constitutional law scholarship, however, is still often legal scholarship of the
more traditional sort. It involves (translated) cases and discussions of those
cases, but in a format and language that law professors can understand.218 It can
cast an “empirical light”219 on issues, but an empirical light without the
confusion and complication that might come from consulting other sources of
empirical insight.
Another major potential alternative source of scholarly insight is
international law. As discussed in Section III.B, international law has increased
in prominence, and there are now many treaties, cases, and articles that might
inform constitutional scholarship. But while this field may have some helpful
insights for American constitutional law, there are some problems with
considering it in the context of American constitutional scholarship and
teaching.
International law might have helpful answers, but the questions it asks are
different from the questions comparative constitutional law asks. Devising rules
to govern several countries is different from devising a rule to govern the
domestic constitutional order of one country. A rule for international human
rights law might be constructed at a higher level of generality, or in a weaker
way, because it needs to be implemented by a range of countries in a range of
places by a range of different types of courts and institutions. Looking for a
rule to govern a single country and its inevitably more homogeneous
institutions is different.
In this way, domestic constitutional law has a certain similarity of
language across different countries that international law does not share with
domestic constitutional law. David Law can write about the “generic
constitutional law”220 that characterizes every constitutional system, and Justice
Breyer can discuss the “common legal problem[s]”221 that domestic
218. See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (2002)
(“[I]nterpreting and evaluating accessible legal texts is the cheapest, easiest, and quickest way for
authors to get into print. This approach requires no special expertise beyond what is available through
traditional law school training, and it offers the potential of influencing the subjects of its inquiry.”
(citation omitted)).
219. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005).
221. Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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constitutional systems face. Constitutional law seems to have certain
similarities across countries, which suggests that borrowing is possible and
insights can be gleaned, since the questions are roughly similar. Tiers of
scrutiny are another way to address a problem like the one proportionality is
trying to address. International law has a different language and doctrinal and
political structure because it is trying to address a different set of problems.
In addition to the costs of other alternatives, there are also reasons to
think that comparative constitutional law in particular has some particular
benefits as a source of insight. As a methodological matter, since the potential
sources of comparative insight are much greater in number (hundreds of
countries rather than simply the history of one country, the United States, or of
fifty states) it is much more likely that there will be a constitutional experience
directly on point rather than simply tangentially related. If we want to know
what happens when a country adopts a national constitutional rule requiring
gay marriage, there is no directly on-point American experience. There is
experience with state rules, but the only directly applicable experience is
foreign. Then there can be scholarship translating that experience into a more
comprehensible format for American legal scholars.222
This is comparative constitutional law as empirically relevant—but there
is more. After several hundred years of American constitutional experience,
and with several hundred law schools producing several thousand scholars
writing about constitutional law for several decades, we may simply have run
out of truly new ideas in the American constitutional context. Where
comparative experience is similar to ours, it can be helpful for empirical
reasons. But where comparative experience is truly different, it might be one of
the last sources of genuinely new ideas or empirical insights.
Many of the concerns about comparative constitutional scholarship are
not unique to comparative scholarship and are shared by all forms of
scholarship that do not involve reading basic American legal texts found on
Lexis or Westlaw. The problems involved in understanding the experiences of
other countries are significant, but not necessarily any more formidable than
other sources of insight based on experience. There is no reason why it is easier
fully to understand the American constitutional situation in 1787, or the
intricacies of the constitutional experience of Alabama in 2010, if one is not
from either of those times or places.223
This is particularly true now that comparative constitutional law, as will
222. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR
BETTER OR FOR WORSE? (2006) (discussing these foreign experiences and what they suggest for the
American context).
223. Those who are critical of courts citing foreign law argue that comparative constitutional
law is too difficult. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 86 (2005) (“To know how much weight to give a decision of the
German Constitutional Court in an abortion case, one would want to know such things as how the judges
of that court are appointed, how they conceive of their role, and, most important and most elusive, how
German attitudes toward abortion have been shaped by peculiarities of German history.”). Judge Posner
might be correct that it is hard for courts to consider foreign law, because they do not have the resources,
the time, or the training to engage in that type of analysis. But they also lack more training and the
ability to analyze the practical implications of their decisions, as he advocates. Id. at 90.
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be discussed in greater detail in Part V, is developing an intellectual
infrastructure. It became much easier to discuss the Constitutional Convention
once Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal Convention224 was published.
Likewise, now that Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg have compiled a
database of the large majority of constitutional texts over history225 and reports
analyzing that database,226 it is getting easier to talk about foreign constitutional
experience. The difficulties of this type of research are substantial, but
particularly now, they are no more substantial than any type of research that
extends beyond reading American legal texts and cases.
B. How the Warren Court and Reactions to It Affected Comparative
Constitutional Law
Comparative constitutional law largely disappeared from law schools, as
Part II discussed, and this was in part because of the obsessive focus by the
profession on the Warren Court, as Part III explained. But only now that the
field of comparative constitutional law is enjoying something of a resurgence
can the damage done by this Warren Court-induced disappearance become
clearer. It is not merely the absence of comparative constitutional law
scholarship that was damaging. Instead, this absence plus the entrenchment of
an alternative infrastructure means that it will be very difficult for comparative
constitutional law to revive itself. Starting from zero is hard enough, but
because of the nature of the disappearance of comparative constitutional law,
the field is actually starting from less than zero. Other fields have become more
entrenched, and it is hard to undo the scholarly infrastructure they have created
in absolute or relative terms.
During the Fall Era, the American legal system sent those potentially
interested in comparative constitutional law a clear message: we do not care
about what you care about. Because of this message, an infrastructure was built
to support domestic litigation and to support scholarship related to this
litigation. This infrastructure was created at the expense of any infrastructure
related to comparative and international law, and it was created by and for
social movements that focused on domestic litigation and were largely
oblivious to comparative constitutional issues. This infrastructure was initially
created to support and extend the decisions of the Warren Court, but in some
ways those in opposition have joined in to limit or roll back the decisions of the
Warren Court. The rise of the “conservative legal movement” that Steven Teles
describes227 was in many ways an attempt to repeal the decisions of the Warren
Court. But even if its goal was to develop new domestic legal arguments for
why the Warren Court was wrong (based in originalism or law and economics,
for example), this movement was still engaging with the domestic legal
224. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
225. Constitutions Repository, CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG, http://www.constitutionmaking
.org (follow “Repository” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
226. See Reports, CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG, http://www.constitutionmaking.org/reports
.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
227. See TELES, supra note 129.
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arguments pushed by the Warren Court and not with comparative constitutional
law.
The Warren Court made some references to comparative constitutional
law, but besides those occasional references and one international law case
(Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino228), it largely rejected nondomestic
legal arguments. This became most obvious when a range of “American courts
consistently . . . turned away challenges”229 to the Vietnam War based in part
on comparative legal arguments. A range of civil rights claims were brought to
American courts and other legal institutions as comparative legal arguments,
but these arguments were roundly defeated or, more often, ignored.230 The
message was clear: arguments based on non-American legal sources,
particularly comparative legal sources, were a complete waste of time, while
domestic legal arguments were a worthwhile focus of attention. Groups like the
civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental
movement structured themselves to bring domestic legal claims and nothing
else.
Because there is no infrastructure of ideas and action related to
comparative constitutional law, there are no institutions or actors to reiterate a
message about the role of comparative constitutional law in the American legal
system. It is simply harder to convince people to accept something if they were
socialized without even knowing of its existence.231 There is a strong normative
power of the actual, and with no cases decided and no arguments articulated
related to comparative constitutional law, the field has an enormous uphill
battle to fight.
As a result, when a decision like Lawrence v. Texas232 references
comparative constitutional law, it is seen as somehow new and therefore
unsettling—a cynical and revolutionary strategic ploy (in that case by
constitutional liberals), rather than a normal and accepted part of our
constitutional praxis. Comparative constitutional law now has to convince
people that it is helpful and relevant because it is viewed as a new
constitutional subject. Part of the normative power of the actual is that the
inevitable conflict that is produced when legal institutions take jurisprudential
arguments seriously produces certain settled understandings or basic
agreements on first principles. As the literature about social movements
explains, “Vying movements may view each other with enmity, but to make
claims that satisfy the . . . public . . . movements need, however indirectly, to
answer objections the other has raised. Answering an opponent’s objections is a

228. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
229. Koh, Transnational Litigation, supra note 155, at 2364.
230. See generally Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil
Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984).
231. See Michael Roskin, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms
and Foreign Policy, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 563 (1974) (showing that a generation’s formative experiences
establish its dominant normative paradigms, which are not supplanted until the arrival of a new
generation).
232. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
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practice of recognition, however begrudging.”233 This is entirely lacking when
it comes to comparative constitutional law.
There might have been intense conflict about the Warren Court at first
and for a while, but with time there came to be certain basic shared core
principles that many groups could accept—perhaps equivalent to what the
conservative Rehnquist Court, in declining to overrule Roe v. Wade, called
“essential”234 to Roe and the constitutional treatment of abortion.235 Reva
Siegel has argued that this is what transpired in conflicts about the
constitutional treatment of gender, resulting in a shared understanding of
formal equality.236 The same is true of race. The battle over race was bitter at
the time, but because it was a battle, at a minimum, “Brown became a fixed
point in the legal culture.”237 A Republican President, Richard Nixon, agreed
with it,238 and John Roberts cited it as substantial positive precedent in his
central opinion on race and the Constitution.239
When it comes to the more purely theoretical—as opposed to practical—
implications of jurisprudential movements, the same dynamic prevails. Conflict
can be good and clarifying for jurisprudential movements in creating consensus
on first principles. It was helpful for law and economics to have both the
conservative, later Reagan judicial appointee Posner, as well as the liberal, later
Clinton judicial appointee Calabresi writing in that movement.240 Calabresi and
Posner might have disagreed about outcomes, but “both . . . embraced the core
of economic analysis as a mechanism for thinking about legal problems.”241
With no litigation, intellectual, or other infrastructure built up around
comparative constitutional law, there has been no conflict about these issues.
Groups like the ACLU or NAACP on the left, or the Christian Coalition or
Right to Life Coalition on the right, did not bother to argue about comparative

233. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 12, at 1365.
234. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (“A decision to overrule Roe’s
essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of
both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to
the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do
so today.”).
235. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 3-8
(1970); Mark Tushnet, Politics, National Identity, and the Thin Constitution, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 545,
548 (2000).
236. See Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 12; see also Robin West, Constitutional
Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1471-72 (2006) (“Siegel’s
major historical thesis is that this understanding of what is now called formal equality—where women
are the same as men they must be treated the same—was the product of social struggle . . . . It is worth
noting . . . that if her characterization of this constitutional contestation in the public sphere is correct,
each side gave something up to forge this new constitutional meaning.”).
237. Bruce Ackerman, supra note 12, at 1431.
238. Id.; see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (arguing that social
movement conflict shaped the modern understanding of discrimination on account of race).
239. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007)
(arguing that the “fundamental principle” behind the decision “goes back . . . to Brown itself”).
240. See George L. Priest, Henry Manne and the Market Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 328 (1999) (“It was the debate between the Chicagoan and the Yalie, the
conservative and the ultra-liberal, which had the influence.”).
241. Id.
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constitutional law, because courts and others told them not to bother. And with
no conflict, we are still debating first principles about whether scholars and
courts should even be examining what other countries are doing in the first
place. Conservatives writing about comparative constitutional law, with few
exceptions, write to contest its very validity rather than to engage with it, and
liberals are still encouraging people to study comparative constitutional law in
the first place. Everyone is still debating first principles.
The Court’s decision in Lawrence is a good example of this dynamic.
One of the core principles articulated in the decision—that private consensual
sodomy is constitutionally protected—was contested within the professional
legal culture,242 but for the most part it was not contested in the White House,
Congress, or the general public. However, the use of comparative constitutional
law citations was contested within the professional culture,243 leading members
of Congress to call for the potential impeachment of Supreme Court Justices.244
Even the minimal use of the jurisprudential practices of comparative
constitutional law—a tangential and largely irrelevant citation of a few
paragraphs in a Supreme Court case—was deeply controversial and contested.
The recent intense conflict over this issue, though perhaps unfortunate on its
own terms, is therefore perhaps encouraging because it means that there will be
the types of conflicts in our constitutional culture that eventually move
jurisprudential movements forward.
A major part of the reason that the Warren Court’s interest in domestic
litigation set comparative constitutional law further back concerns the
relationship between the profession, social movements, and jurisprudential
movements. There is much scholarship on the role that social movements can
play in changing the profession and what the profession can do for social
movements, but jurisprudential movements are also part of the equation. The
jurisprudential movements created by the Warren Court were also in part
created by social movements. The arguments, infrastructure, and personnel of
the civil rights movement certainly played a substantial role in creating modern
constitutional scholarship. Some scholars, like Mark Tushnet, write about that
social movement;245 others, like Owen Fiss, were in the Justice Department and
working on these issues.246 There are Women’s Studies departments and
African-American Studies Departments and changed classes and scholarship in
the rest of the university in substantial part because of social movements.
But no social movement ever really cared about comparative

242. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1577-79 (2004).
243. See id. at 1580-81.
244. See Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC.COM (Mar.
11, 2004), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232 (quoting Congressman Tom Feeney as stating, “To the
extent [judges] deliberately ignore Congress’s admonishment [about the use of foreign law in court
decisions], they are no longer engaging in ‘good behavior’ in the meaning of the Constitution and they
may subject themselves to the ultimate remedy, which would be impeachment”).
245. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (2005).
246. See Curriculum Vitae: Owen Fiss, supra note 134.
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constitutional law. There are many reasons that they could have. Comparative
constitutional law could have strategic legal uses for various sides, and its
comparative nature might have been a natural fit for an internationally oriented
movement like the nuclear peace movement or the immigrants’ rights
movement. Led by a Warren Court and then a profession that focused
everything on domestic law, however, there was no strategic reason for any
social movement to invest in or care about comparative constitutional issues. A
good example of this dynamic comes from the recent confirmation hearings for
Sonia Sotomayor. When Sotomayor said potentially negative things about race
or gender during the confirmation hearings, the groups related to those social
movements reacted with criticism and political pressure.247 When she said
negative things about comparative constitutional law, there were no groups to
react.248
Because of this entire infrastructure related to domestic law, not only has
comparative constitutional law suffered, but so too has American judicial
review. The singular concern of those who studied the Warren Court was to
find a domestic legal justification for the Court’s decisions. For instance, Frank
Michelman provided a Rawlsian justification.249 John Hart Ely provided a
justification based on democratic theory.250 Their arguments were different, but
their raison d’être was the same: to find a way to justify a court decision and
the judicial authority to issue that decision based on domestic legal sources. But
there have been and continue to be other arguments in favor of judicial review,
particularly from comparative experience, stemming from the fact that about
ninety percent of the countries in the world use it, many with great success.
This has also been damaging for political movements that want to elicit
favorable decisions from the Supreme Court and other courts, and so want to
encourage scholars to write about issues that support these movements. The
Warren Court handed down several decisions that supported liberal causes.
Some liberals argued that the Court should use only domestic law in support of
these decisions because the use of nondomestic sources risked drawing
additional and unnecessary criticism to its already controversial holdings.251
The result was that, once the Court was less favorable to the domestic
legal claims being brought by liberals—as the Warren Court turned into the
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts—liberals had to make claims that might
have been constitutionally worthy, but were much more radical in the eyes of
the Court than they needed to be. There were many law professors who first
made their careers in practice related to the domestic legal infrastructure and/or

247. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, Liberalism Had Little Presence in Sotomayor
Hearings, WASH. POST, July 19, 2009, at A3 (discussing objections of liberal interest groups to
comments on abortion and gay rights).
248. Id. (featuring no mention of Sotomayor comments on foreign law).
249. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
250. See ELY, supra note 137.
251. See Koh, Transnational Litigation, supra note 155, at 2364 n.96 (“My colleague Owen
Fiss has suggested to me that some Supreme Court justices hesitated to take such a step for fear of
undermining the Court’s domestic advances in the area of civil rights.”).
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clerked for Warren Court Justices (Harold Koh, who worked at the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and Vicki Jackson, who clerked for
Justice Thurgood Marshall, for example) who later turned to comparative
constitutional issues once the more conservative Supreme Court turned against
many of their arguments about domestic constitutional law. By that point,
though, however compelling their work was, they were working in academia,
and the Supreme Court had years of experience in justifying its decisions based
exclusively on domestic law arguments. It was completely new territory for
these scholars and for the courts they were trying to convince.
The same could be said of the conservative legal movement and its
relationship to judicial review. Although the conservative movement might
now have a Supreme Court more favorable to its claims, the current climate of
renewed interest in comparative constitutional law might lead the Court to turn
more to the right than it would otherwise to be consistent with comparative
constitutional law that is more conservative. There is plenty of conservative
comparative constitutional law, as Justice Scalia, among others, has noted.252
When the conservative legal movement faced a completely inhospitable
Warren Court, maybe it would have helped if conservative legal scholars also
made comparative constitutional arguments. And, if a liberal Supreme Court
exists again, maybe it would help if conservatives prepared that liberal Court
for the conservative comparative constitutional law it would have considered
earlier and therefore should consider again.
Of course, all of these concerns might be avoided if liberals and
conservatives and domestic and comparative scholars alike create a durable
structure for comparative constitutional law. The next Part discusses how that
might be done.
V.

REVERSING THE FALL AND RECREATING THE RISE

Comparative constitutional law has enjoyed something of a resurgence in
the past ten years. The years since 1989 have featured an increasingly globally
engaged legal profession. Just as the years after World War II featured a wave
of constitutional creation around the world that attracted the interest of the
American bar, so too have the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall.253 The
profession has responded by creating groups like the Central and East European
Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar Association,254 and law firms have
opened offices overseas in record numbers.255
It took nearly ten years after 1989 for these developments to affect legal
pedagogy and scholarship, but now they certainly have. A series of Harvard

252. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-27 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
comparative constitutional law that favors more conservative constitutional outcomes).
253. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J.
COMP. L. 707, 715-16 (2001).
254. See Sandra Day O’Connor, CEELI Award Ceremony and Luncheon: ABA Annual Meeting,
42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715 (1998)
255. See Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 738
(1994).
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Law Review Forewords have discussed comparative constitutional law,
including one written by a Supreme Court Justice of another country.256
Prominent law reviews are publishing more articles related to comparative
constitutional law,257 and law reviews in general are publishing comparative
constitutional law articles in greater numbers than during the Fall Era.258
During the recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Elena Kagan, she
was asked about her decision as Dean of Harvard Law School to require a
comparative or international law class but not a constitutional law class.259
Because of efforts to “bring the state back in,”260 cognate disciplines have
started to examine comparative constitutional politics again.
This time, though, this interest in comparative constitutional law needs to
be more durable. Interest in the field is of course not new, but durability would
be. Based on some efforts that were successful during the Rise Era, and some
of the tactics used by other successful jurisprudential efforts, this Part begins
the project of creating a durable second Rise Era by suggesting several reforms
to American legal education.
A. Speaking to the Profession and to Law Schools
First, just as Henry Manne did for law and economics, a series of
seminars could be offered every year in comparative constitutional law for
judges, law professors, and law review editors. Manne’s seminars reached over
five hundred judges, from conservatives to liberals like Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(when she was on the D.C. Circuit).261 At one point, Manne’s seminars had
been attended by forty percent of the federal judiciary.262 The judges attending
the seminars generally considered the program to be a success, and it
influenced their decisions, therefore making law and economics of greater
256. See Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19 (2002); Calabresi, supra note 205, at
110-12, 124-30; Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 13, 24, 27 (1995); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2008); Morton J. Horowitz, The Supreme Court, 1992
Term—Foreword: The Constitution of Change—Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107
HARV. L. REV. 30, 47-48, 96 (1993); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword:
Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 54-55, 67
(2007); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 29-30, 32-34, 48, 78-79, 99-10l, 128 (2004); Posner, supra
note 223, at 55, 86-88, 100, 102; Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 29-30
(1999).
257. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004).
258. While law reviews published very few articles on comparative constitutional law between
1972 and 1989, as well as between 1989 and 1999, since 1999 they have published a great number of
articles on the subject (though nowhere near the numbers that they published during the Rise Era). For a
good example, see, for instance, Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405
(2007).
259. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S6669 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
260. PETER B. EVANS, DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER & THEDA SKOCPOL, BRINGING THE STATE
BACK IN 28 (1985).
261. See TELES, supra note 129; Ronald A. Cass, One Among the Manne: Changing Our
Course, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 208 (1999).
262. TELES, supra note 129, at 113.
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interest to the profession.263 Manne involved a range of law professors in these
seminars, which interested a range of law professors who were otherwise
uninterested in law and economics.264 These seminars also educated law review
editors in law and economics, which made them more comfortable with articles
about the topic.265 These programs also received a great amount of media
attention, which led to even more awareness and therefore discussion of law
and economics.266
George Priest has identified several reasons why these programs were
successful: the seminars were free, featured prominent scholars, were held in
great locations (often Miami), and featured illuminating (and cross-ideological)
content.267 One could imagine a similar situation for comparative constitutional
law seminars. A group like the Ford Foundation, so crucial to the success of
comparative constitutional law during the Rise Era, could also subsidize these
classes during a more durable Rise Era right now. It should also be easy to hold
classes about comparative constitutional law in appealing geographical
locations. Just as Manne’s seminars featured liberal instructors like Paul
Samuelson,268 along with liberal attendees like Justice Ginsburg and District
Court Judge Jack Weinstein,269 these comparative constitutional law seminars
could feature conservatives like Steven Calabresi.270
In addition to seminars, other efforts could be taken to ensure that the
profession realizes the relevance of comparative constitutional law. An
overview of the field, provided either in the form of treatises or restatements,
could also help interest lawyers practicing in the field, as well as scholars
writing about the field. Originalism was substantially assisted by the creation of
books documenting discussions about the Constitution at the time of the
Founding. G. Edward White has written about how many jurisprudential
movements and areas of law were assisted by the intellectual aid provided by
the creation of the Restatements in the early part of the twentieth century,271
263. See Celia W. Dugger, Paid Course May Pass Judges’ Group, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1980,
at C1 (quoting Manne as saying, “If I wasn’t doing my job well, the judges wouldn’t come in droves.
I’m waiting for someone to come up with a better program.”).
264. See Marylyn Bender, Lawyers and Economics, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1971, at F1; Editorial,
Economics Anyone?, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1971, at 8; Edwin McDowell, Bringing Law Profs Up to
Date on Economics, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1973, at 8.
265. See Henry N. Butler, The Manne Program in Economics for Federal Judges, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 351, 355 (1999).
266. See Walter Guzzardi, Jr., Judges Discover the World of Economics, FORTUNE, May 21,
1979, at 58. There was also a front-page story in The Washington Post. Fred Barbash, Big Corporations
Bankroll Seminars for U.S. Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1980, at A1.
267. See Priest, supra note 240, at 330.
268. See Butler, supra note 265, at 354 n.8.
269. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Contribution of Henry G. Manne Towards the Education of the
American Judiciary, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 421 (1999).
270. Steven Calabresi is one of the few conservatives actually writing about comparative
constitutional law, not just objecting to its existence. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kyle Brady, Is
Separation of Powers Exportable?, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2010); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Virtues of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong To Prefer the German to the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001). He also teaches comparative law and comparative
constitutional law. See Faculty & Research: Steven G. Calabresi, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/StevenCalabresi/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
271. See G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist
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and the same could be true of comparative constitutional law.
An amicus group briefing the Supreme Court on what comparative
constitutional law says about the issues before the Court could draw attention to
the field and encourage the Court to reference these materials—which in turn
would cause the profession to care about these issues and scholars to write
about them. Right now, briefs referencing comparative constitutional law are
presented to the Court, but only rarely, and generally only to support liberal
positions on constitutional issues.272 There is certainly plenty of comparative
constitutional law that would favor conservatives, and therefore no reason for
lawyers trying to win particular cases for conservative causes to fear this
discussion of comparative constitutional law.273
As part of interesting the profession in comparative constitutional law, it
would also be helpful to attract the interest of advocacy groups. Part of the
reason that the Warren Court dominated American constitutional law is that it
created social movements with a strategic interest in the rhetoric and outcome
of its cases. There is no comparative constitutional law social movement. It
might be true that the infrastructure related to the international human rights
movement (including groups like Amnesty International, referenced earlier)
could at some point decide to use comparative constitutional arguments, but for
some time now their attention has been almost entirely directed elsewhere.
Activists on both sides have an interest in pushing comparative
constitutional law. Liberals will like how much more progressive comparative
constitutional law is than American constitutional law on many race and gender
issues, like affirmative action.274 Conservatives will like how much more
restrictive comparative constitutional law is when it comes to abortion rights.275
Various groups—from liberals to conservatives to those who care about foreign
policy to immigrants’ rights groups—might find in comparative constitutional
law shared outcome-based and process-based grievances.276
B. Constructing Law Schools
Law schools, supported by the profession, need to provide the resources
to train those potentially interested in comparative constitutional law.
Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1997).
272. For instance, Harold Koh has filed several amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, but
always only to support “liberal” positions on the constitutional issues before the Court. See, e.g., Brief
for Mary Robinson et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (No. 02-102).
273. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), discussed
supra note 252.
274. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(discussing how the Court’s decision “accords with the international understanding of the office of
affirmative action”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An
International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999) (discussing the comparative
and international law of affirmative action).
275. Roper, 543 U.S. at 625-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), discussed in supra note 252 and
accompanying text.
276. See John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A
Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1214 (1977) (demonstrating that shared grievances and shared
claims are the essence of social movements).
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Specialized fellowships have proven crucial to jurisprudential movements and
to cultivating the personnel to support them. Specialized fellowships create a
deep bench of potential scholars who can teach at schools of all kinds and all
rankings. The Burger, Hurst, and Warren Fellowships were crucial to the
development of professors to teach and write about legal history.277 The Olin
Fellowships were similarly important for law and economics.278 During the
Rise Era, the Story Fellowships at Harvard Law School were crucial to the
development of comparative constitutional law.279 Critical legal studies, a much
less successful jurisprudential movement, by contrast, never had a substantial
future law professor fellowship.
With the creation of the type of intellectual infrastructure mentioned
earlier, there would be more resources available for those interested in writing
about comparative constitutional law. But beyond just this, there needs to be a
substantial return to the integrated method, both in the teaching of law school
classes and the writing of constitutional scholarship. In the classroom,
constitutional law classes can feature discussions of comparative constitutional
issues as part of introductory or basic constitutional law courses. Some, most
notably Roscoe Pound, have raised the general idea of “the pervasive method”
for comparative law,280 which was used widely during the Rise Era.
Importantly, this method would involve teaching the domestic, American
constitutional issue, and then using the comparative constitutional approach as
a policy alternative.281
This approach has worked well before, in the Rise Era, and it can work
well again.282 If students learned comparative constitutional law in this way,
they would not be resistant to its relevance. They would embrace it, because
they would be likely to see it as a normal part of learning domestic

277. See G. Edward White, The Origins of Modern American Legal History, in
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 6 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds.,
2009) (“In the higher tiers of law schools in 1967 . . . only Penn, Wisconsin, N.Y.U. and Virginia, in
addition to Harvard, had legal historians on their faculties . . . . Allowing for some mobility, between
1971 and 1978 participants in the Warren [Fellowship] program had secured positions on the Buffalo,
Chicago, DePaul, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Rutgers-Camden,
UCLA, Vermont and Virginia, and Wisconsin faculties.”).
278. See TELES, supra note 129, at 175.
279. See supra notes 53-54.
280. Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum, 8
TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (1934). For other endorsements of this approach, see Fontana, supra note 174;
Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F.
49 (1996); and Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 622-23 (1938). For
a criticism of teaching comparative law this way, see Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Role of the “Basic
Course” in the Teaching of Foreign and Comparative Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 616, 616-17 (1971).
281. For arguments in favor of this approach, see Mark Tushnet, How (And How Not) To Use
Comparative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 674
(2004).
282. See Brian K. Landesberg, The Use of International and Comparative Sources in a
Domestic Constitutional Law Course 1, 3-4, http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/
LandsbergBrian(USA).pdf (last viewed Oct. 26, 2010) (“About half the students [learning comparative
law] even said the materials were more interesting than their domestic law materials, and about half also
said that their exposure to global materials made them more likely to take international electives. A
slight majority also said that the materials aided their understanding of law, and three quarters of the
students said that the global materials helped them to see alternate approaches to legal problems . . . .”).
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constitutional law, which they have no concerns about doing and see
themselves as potentially practicing and needing to know about after they
graduate. If comparative materials were placed in our regular domestic law
casebooks, then students might take comparative constitutional law more
seriously—as something that American law students studying to be American
lawyers might have to know, and as something they cannot avoid anyway
because it is in the casebook they have been assigned (meaning there is no extra
expense involved in purchasing an additional book, and no degrading of the
comparative material because it is in a separate book).283 Faculty might
embrace teaching comparative constitutional law through the pervasive
method,284 since they are generally not interested in comparative constitutional
law per se but may be interested in its relationship to the domestic
constitutional law issues they teach and write about more usually.285
Law professors do not need as much expertise to teach the comparative as
it relates to the American rather than the comparative on its own. Faculty might
not know much about the history and political context of Marbury, but are
comfortable teaching it as part of a few class sessions. The same might be true
of comparative constitutional law. And again, comparative constitutional law
still involves teaching cases and drawing on traditional legal materials. It does
not ask professors to teach statistics, negotiations, or some other entirely
different sort of pedagogical material than is normally part of the constitutional
law class. With the pervasive method in place, current law students, and
therefore future lawyers and law professors, would be more interested in
comparative constitutional law.
Teaching comparative constitutional law through the pervasive method
would also remedy some of the problems that have prevented other attempts at
promoting comparative constitutional law from succeeding. There have been
two new comparative constitutional law casebooks in the past ten years or
so,286 as well as several readers discussing comparative constitutional issues.287
But requiring students to purchase an entirely new book—and asking faculty to
assign that book—simply for the sake of teaching comparative materials will
283. It is here, then, where I admire but have some concerns with the impressive project led by
Hiram Chodosh of the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah to create a series of
supplements highlighting comparative elements that might be used in domestic law classes. I fear that
creating separate books might discourage students from taking these supplements seriously, and
discourage faculty from assigning them for that reason (not to mention the cost and resulting
dissatisfaction that might come from having to purchase an additional book).
284. See Tushnet, supra note 281, at 671 (“Law faculties seem increasingly interested in
figuring out how to incorporate non-U.S. legal materials in basic courses.”); see also Neil S. Siegel,
Some Modest Uses of Transnational Legal Perspectives in First-Year Constitutional Law, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 201, 201 (2006) (“[E]ven professors who remain focused on U.S. constitutional law incorporate
transnational legal perspectives in their instruction.”).
285. Tushnet, supra note 281, at 671.
286. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1999).
287. Aspen Publishers has a series of comparative constitutional law readers, each one focused
on a particular constitutional law topic and meant to supplement the domestic law teaching on that topic.
See Academic Bulletin: University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Summer
2009), http://www.asil.org/ab/academibullsummer09/utah.html (describing the new Aspen series).
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not be popular or successful. This is part of the reason that the pervasive
method of teaching legal ethics failed: there were not enough students or
faculty willing to purchase a separate book that talked about legal ethics and
how those issues arise in each area of law.288
Just as the pervasive method would create a legal pedagogy to improve
comparative constitutional law, so too would integrated scholarship create a
scholarship to help comparative constitutional law. There might be concern
about whether integrated scholarship—particularly when it comes to something
potentially intellectually challenging like comparative constitutional law—
might promote a certain amount of superficiality in scholarship and the
unfortunate phenomenon that Mark Tushnet has called the “lawyer as
astrophysicist,”289 according to which someone with a law degree can learn
enough about any topic that they care to study. This same concern arose when
law and economics started to produce integrated scholarship.290 In the study of
other countries, there has been a similar debate between those who do area
studies—deep studies of particular countries—and those who do large-N
studies—studies of more countries with less depth for each country.
But integrated scholarship need not be superficial scholarship. Just as
jurisprudential movements like law and economics turned to the more detailed
studies of cognate disciplines like economics for support for their claims, so too
could integrated comparative constitutional law scholars turn to more detailed
cognate scholarship to support substantially American conclusions. (Indeed,
they already have.)291 Comparative constitutional law is a field that is big
enough for those coming from the American constitutional scholarly tradition,
like Bruce Ackerman, Vicki Jackson, or Mark Tushnet, as well as from the
more comparative tradition, like Tom Ginsburg or Alec Stone Sweet.
At a more fundamental level, jurisprudential movements like law and
economics and comparative constitutional law face choices. These choices are
not always dichotomous, but they do involve setting priorities. A
jurisprudential movement can choose to be methodologically pure and
therefore speak only to the abilities and concerns of those writing in the narrow
field. Or it can decide to accept that at least some of its scholars some of the
time will have to sacrifice methodological purity and topic selection to make
research of interest to a larger community.292 For jurisprudential movements,
the wider community is the all-important rest of the law school and the
profession, which can make or break a movement. Sometimes a jurisprudential
288. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 33 (1992).
289. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 28, 31
(1999).
290. See James E. Krier, Economic Analysis of Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1664, 1683 (1974)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)) (“In sum, my point about the
property materials in Economic Analysis of Law is that so much could have been explored that was not.
What is done is generally done well; the few points pursued are pursued effectively.”).
291. For a helpful example of this, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1230 (“By far the bulk of this
Article deals with U.S. constitutional law, not the constitutional law of other nations.”).
292. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency and Insider Trading: Deconstructing
the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 481 (2001) (noting that law and
economics sacrificed much of its methodological rigor and adopted “no single economic theory”).
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movement has to prioritize being relevant almost as much as it has to prioritize
being right.
VI. CONCLUSION
At a time when members of Congress threaten to impeach Supreme Court
Justices for citing the constitutional law of other countries,293 it is hard to
remember back to a period when there was widespread interest in the
constitutions of other countries. Comparative constitutional law is now seen as
polarizing—an issue to campaign for or against—rather than as a staple of the
intellectual and pedagogical diet of law schools. But there was an earlier period
where interest in the field was both common and assumed, rather than rare and
contentious.
That period has passed, though, and the disappearance of a jurisprudential
movement is not rare. Movements come and go, because the interests and
activities of the legal profession come and go. What is most consequential
about the disappearance of comparative constitutional law, though, is what the
scholars who studied similar questions have produced in its absence:
scholarship with brave, bold, and original new ideas, but ideas that we could
have better understood in light of the experiences of the rest of the world.
As law schools continue to respond to these increasingly dynamic times
in the law and in the university, the challenge is to ensure that such an
important jurisprudential movement does not entirely disappear yet again. The
structures of American legal education that helped law schools be cosmopolitan
during the Rise Era and helped jurisprudential entrepreneurs like Richard
Posner create law and economics must be applied to create a durable and
permanent interest in comparative constitutional law. As the late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist wrote when dozens of countries were creating constitutions
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, “now that constitutional law is solidly
grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin
looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own
deliberative process.”294

293. See Curry, supra note 244.
294. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM
411, 412 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).

